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Over the Borderline—A Review of Margaret Price’s
Mad at School: Rhetorics of Mental Disability and
Academic Life
Gregory M. Duhl*
This Article is about “madness” in higher education. In Mad at
School: Rhetorics of Mental Disability and Academic Life, Professor
Margaret Price analyzes the rhetoric and discourse surrounding mental
disabilities in academia. In this Article, I place Price’s work in a legal
context, discussing why the Americans with Disabilities Act fails those
with mental illness and why reform is needed to protect them. My own
narrative as a law professor with Borderline Personality Disorder
frames my critique. Narratives of mental illness are important because
they help connect those who are often stigmatized and isolated due to
mental illness and provide a framework for them to overcome barriers
limiting their equal participation in academic life.
INTRODUCTION
In Mad at School: Rhetorics of Mental Disability and Academic
Life,1 Margaret Price writes about academics (i.e., students, staff,
faculty, and administrators) who are “mad” in higher education.2
Despite often burying her readers in rhetorical theory, Price offers a

* Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. I thank Jim Hilbert and
Jaclyn Millner who often go to great lengths to prevent me from going “mad” or “losing my
mind.” I also thank my friends and family who have helped me behind the scenes. You know
who you are.
1. MARGARET PRICE, MAD AT SCHOOL: RHETORICS OF MENTAL DISABILITY AND ACADEMIC
LIFE (2011).
2. Price states that:
Mad is a term generally used in non-U.S. contexts, and has a long history of positive
and person-centered discourses. MindFreedom International, a coalition of grassroots
organizations, traces the beginning of the “Mad Movement” to the early 1970s, and
reports on “Mad Pride” events that continue to take place in countries including
Australia, Ghana, Canada, England, and the United States . . . .
....
. . . As with queer, the broad scope of mad carries the drawback of generality but also
the power of mass.
Id. at 10.
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refreshing discussion of mental disability in academic life, inviting a
dialogue that has long been missing in legal education. In focusing on
the rhetoric and discourse surrounding mental illness, Price departs
from traditional legal and medical analyses of the rights of the mentally
ill and “cures” for mental illness. 3 In doing so, she offers a blueprint for
increased understanding and acceptance of, and participation by, those
who are “mad” in legal education.
I am “mad.” As a law professor, students, staff, and faculty
colleagues often have called me a “mad genius,” with the usual
connotations that the label suggests—“brilliant,” “eccentric,”
“unorthodox,” “creative,” and “inspiring.” 4 At the same time, my
students tell me if my socks do not match or my shirt is only half tucked
into my jeans. 5 I certainly get “mad” or “angry,” which is more
scientifically defined as feeling “inappropriate, intense anger or
[having] difficulty controlling anger.” 6 Quite literally, I have often
been “mad” at “school”—the school at which I am studying or working.
Lastly, while I usually do not refer to myself in this way, I am “mad” in
the sense that I am mentally ill; oscillating like a yo-yo, I regularly
experience periods of mania, irritability, insomnia, anxiety, and
depression, often all in the same day. Even if, rhetorically, medicine
and science cannot define a “normal” mind, symptomatically, I do not
feel “normal.”
To the best of my knowledge, I now join only two other law
professors who have written narratives about how their own chronic

3. Price describes this rhetoric:
Th[e] well/unwell paradigm has many problems, particularly its implication that a mad
person needs to be “cured” by some means. One material consequence of this view is
that mental health insurance operates on a “cure” basis, demanding “progress” reports
from therapists and social workers, and cutting off coverage when the patient is
deemed to have achieved a sufficiently “well” state.
Id. at 12.
4. Cf. id. at 2 (“That film [A Beautiful Mind] upholds a truism about mental illness, namely, its
link to creative genius. . . . The commonsense link between madness and genius arises again and
again, in stories about real people like composer Robert Schumann, who is said to have been
bipolar . . . .”); id. at 16 (“In her ‘bipolar book,’ . . . A Mind Apart, Susanne Antonetta argues that
neurodiversity acts as a positive force in human evolution, enabling alternative and creative ways
of thinking, knowing, and apprehending the world.”). I have also been “diagnosed” (or
misdiagnosed) repeatedly with Bipolar Disorder II. See infra Part I (discussing my struggle to
ascertain a diagnosis for my mental illness).
5. See id. at 2 (“Faculty members who display ‘quirky’ behavior are sometimes regarded with
affection: think of funny Professor X, who mumbles in the hallways and perhaps wears
outlandish outfits.”).
6. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS § 301.83, at 710 (4th ed. rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
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mental illness affects their participation in academic life. 7 I have
Borderline Personality Disorder (“BPD”), a condition “in which people
have long-term patterns of unstable or turbulent emotions, such as
feelings about themselves and others. These inner experiences often
cause them to take impulsive actions and have chaotic relationships.” 8
My reality is defined by black-or-white, right-or-wrong, and good-orbad thinking, although I do not dissociate or live on the border of
psychosis and neurosis. 9 For that reason, “borderline” is an unfortunate
name for this personality disorder and an example, in Price’s words, of
how “persons with mental disabilities are presumed not to be
competent, nor understandable, nor valuable, nor whole.” 10
While mental health professionals commonly believe that “clinicians
should help people with borderline personality disorder to avoid blackand-white thinking, such as right/wrong, good/bad, and all-or-nothing
styles of thinking,” 11 this belief presumes that the “borderline” mind is
unsound or abnormal and that medicine and science can objectively
7. See generally JAMES T.R. JONES, A HIDDEN MADNESS (2011) (describing his decades-long
struggle with bipolar disorder); James T.R. Jones, Walking the Tightrope of Bipolar Disorder:
The Secret Life of a Law Professor, 57 J. LEGAL EDUC. 349 (2007) (same); ELYN R. SAKS, THE
CENTER CANNOT HOLD: MY JOURNEY THROUGH MADNESS (2007) (chronicling her struggles
with schizophrenia); cf. PRICE, supra note 1, at 130 (“[O]ne study of U.S. law schools reveals that
just over 1 percent of their faculty were reported as having disabilities . . . [and] [s]pecific
information on faculty with mental disabilities is even more scarce.”).
8. PubMed Health, Borderline Personality Disorder, U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED. (Nov. 15,
2010), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001931/.
9. Rather than being labeled as a psychotic disorder, BPD is instead recognized as a disorder
characterized by intense emotional experiences and behavior and instability in relationships.
JOHN G. GUNDERSON & PAUL S. LINKS, BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER: A CLINICAL
GUIDE 2, 13–14 (2008). See Anneli Rufus, The Uncertainty Curse, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Mar. 28,
2011), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/stuck/201103/the-uncertainty-curse (describing a
mother’s struggle with BPD). Rufus notes:
I’ve come to believe she had Borderline Personality Disorder, a condition whose
characteristics—identity issues, self-loathing, negativity, black-and-white thinking, and
a sense of emptiness inside—describe her perfectly and tragically. It’s arguably the
most misleadingly named disorder in the DSM, because one wastes a lot of time
wondering: the borderline between what and what? Originally it was neurosis and
psychosis. Later that distinction was retired. This disorder needs a clear new name.
Id.
10. PRICE, supra note 1, at 26. Some commentators also assign blame for BPD’s bad rap to
mental health professionals who haphazardly diagnose the condition. See Jerold Kreisman,
Society’s Changing View of Borderline Personality, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Nov. 25, 2012),
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/i-hate-you-dont-leave-me/201211/societys-changingview-borderline-personality (discussing that when BPD first appeared in the DSM, “most
professionals viewed it as a diagnosis bestowed on difficult, unremitting, pain-in-the-ass
patients”).
11. See, e.g., RICHARD K. RIES ET AL., ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF PATIENTS WITH
COEXISTING MENTAL ILLNESS AND ALCOHOL AND OTHER DRUG ABUSE: TREATMENT
IMPROVEMENT PROTOCOL (TIP) SERIES 9, at 57 (1994).
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define the “normal” mind. As Price notes, “such [disordered] minds
show up all the time, in obvious and not-so-obvious ways[,] . . . [and]
recognizing their appearance is not a yes-no proposition, but rather a
confusing and contextually dependent process that calls into question
what we mean by the ‘normal’ mind.” 12 The array of diagnoses in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) is “so
copious that [the DSM] seems to suggest that ‘human life is a form of
mental illness.’” 13
I have chosen to use the power of my own personal experiences with
mental illness—placed within the context of Price’s work—to fight the
stigma of mental illness and to begin to overturn the barriers that
mentally ill academics encounter in legal education. When I have tried
to write analytically about mental illness in higher education, the
writing has been forced, clinical, and devoid of the intense emotions
that this issue invokes. 14 Even if such analytical writing, with a thesisdriven academic argument, is more “coherent,” I wonder, as Price does,
if the “demonstration of coherence indicate[s] a stronger mind.” 15 The
medical paradigm is incoherent in that it presumes an “objective,
benign, and stable authority,” 16 which is often not the case, as
evidenced by numerous and conflicting mental diagnoses I have
received over the last twenty years. 17 Furthermore, medicine has
trouble grappling with academics who are professionally hyperfunctional but emotionally dysfunctional—therapists, as well as
colleagues and administrators, have often minimized the gravity of my
symptoms because I am “high functioning.” 18 The legal paradigm is
not much better because even with the Americans with Disabilities Act,
courts and commentators have struggled for over twenty years with how
to fit employees with “mental disabilities” into the Act’s framework. 19
12. PRICE, supra note 1, at 3−4.
13. Id. at 3 (quoting Lawrence J. Davis, The Encyclopedia of Insanity, HARPER’S MAG., Feb.
1997, at 61).
14. See id. at 31−32 (“It would seem . . . that reason and emotion reside together quite
comfortably, and hence, that there is ample space to theorize rhetoricity for those with mental
disabilities.”).
15. Id. at 6.
16. Id. at 36−37.
17. See infra Part I (discussing the various diagnoses I have received throughout my struggle
with mental illness).
18. See Anita L. Allen, Mental Disorders and the “System of Judgmental Responsibility,” 90
B.U. L. REV. 621, 623 (2010) (“The group affected by mental disorders includes the high
functioning professionals we rely on[,] . . . including lawyers, judges, physicians and
politicians . . . .”).
19. See, e.g., James Concannon, Mind Matters: Mental Disability and the History and Future
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 36 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 89, 107 (2012) (“Although
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Rather than writing as an “insider”—a “straight, white, educated,
male American citizen” 20—analyzing “who is mentally disabled . . . and
what we do once we have decided a person should be labeled as
such,” 21 I write this narrative as an “outsider” looking in at the
misassumptions of the “normal-minded” in legal education about
academics with mental illness. 22 Traditional critiques of “outsider”
narratives are that they do not “fit into the legal framework of verifiable

individuals with mental impairments were not failing to establish protected-class status more than
plaintiffs with physical impairments, such plaintiffs were still losing at an alarming rate preAmendments Act.”); Michelle Parikh, Note, Burning the Candles at Both Ends, and There Is
Nothing Left for Proof: The Americans with Disabilities Act’s Disservice to Persons with Mental
Illness, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 721, 745 (2004). In her Note, Parikh describes the framework
within the Act:
The incompatibility of the disability definition with mental illness . . . has played out
quite starkly in recent case law. The two main shortcomings of the ADA’s treatment
of mental illness are borne out in the case law of the lower federal courts. By and
large, mentally ill individuals who attempt to gain protection under the ADA are
unsuccessful. On a conceptual level, it is difficult for individuals who are mentally ill
and in the workforce to juggle the dual requirements of disability and qualified
individual status. An individual who clearly suffers from a mental illness that has a
detrimental effect on her work functioning may look to the statute for a safe haven.
What she finds instead are formalistic, rigid requirements, which incur more
qualifications and caveats with each Supreme Court decision. What the ADA drafters
intended to be an individualized, case-by-case inquiry has turned into a series of
obstacles and hoops, as individuals attempt to translate the complexities of their
experiences into the “buzzwords” of the courts’ opinions.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also infra Part III.A (discussing the role of misconceived rhetoric in
stigmatizing mental illness).
20. Carolyn Grose, A Field Trip to Benetton . . . and Beyond: Some Thoughts on “Outsider
Narrative” in a Law School Clinic, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 109, 110 n.4 (1997). Grose defines an
“outsider” as “someone who does not have access to the channels of power and communication in
this society. Practically speaking . . . this means someone who is female, of color, lesbian, gay,
bisexual, undereducated, low-income, poor, disabled, undocumented, non-English speaking, etc.”
Id. at 110.
21. PRICE, supra note 1, at 2.
22. See Marc A. Fajer, Authority, Credibility, and Pre-Understanding: A Defense of Outsider
Narratives in Legal Scholarship, 82 GEO. L.J. 1845, 1854 (1994). In describing the perspectives,
Fajer notes:
We can tell stories about ourselves, not so much to show how we are representative of
our group, but how the society makes essentializing assumptions about us because of
the groups to which we belong. These stories do not purport to show that all members
of the group behave a certain way. Instead, they demonstrate that people commonly
believe members of a group behave in specific ways and they show that some portion
of the group does not conform to the stereotype or at least that the relationship between
the stereotype and reality is complex.
Id. See also Paul Gewirtz, Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE
AND RHETORIC IN LAW 2, 13 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (describing “outsider”
jurisprudence or the “turn to narrative” as a “clear offshoot of the further loss of faith in the idea
of objective truth and the widespread embrace of ideas about the social construction of reality”);
Grose, supra note 20, at 114 n.17 (citing sources).
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truths that creates new legal principles,” 23 but this position presupposes,
in my case, that there is an objective truth about mental diagnoses and
mental illness, which there is not. As Jane Baron notes,
[T]he notion that storytellers must justify departures from “the rules”
of mainstream scholarship “as they exist,” as well as from the
“ordinary understanding” or the “conventional standard” of truth . . .
[is] precisely what many storytellers dispute, namely, that mainstream,
ordinary, and conventional standards are just “there” and themselves
already justified. 24

In other words, the supposed objective truth about mental illness is no
more valuable than my firsthand experience with mental illness in
academia. Without any scientific, objective meaning of the “normal”
mind, narratives matter.
Price gives further warning about the use of mental illness narratives.
She cautions that “such narratives often reify the dominant script of
disability as an individual tragedy (and potential source of triumph
when ‘overcome’).” 25 She calls for academics with mental disabilities
to be heard and respected, “not in spite of [their] mental disabilities, but
with and through them.” 26 We do not need more feel-good stories
23. Grose, supra note 20, at 116. See Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL.
L. REV. 971, 978 (1991) (noting that contrary to the author’s stated intentions, “[the story] does
not help [readers] think about ameliorative legal reforms. . . . The experience conveyed by the
narrative does not seem to translate automatically into a new rule; and the narrative scholarship
seems to provide no ‘normative framework’ for achieving that translation”); Mark Tushnet, The
Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251, 252−60 (1992) (arguing that
“outsider” narrative, with its focus on individual experience, does not relate well to general legal
principles).
24. Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255, 256 (1994) (footnotes
omitted).
25. PRICE, supra note 1, at 178.
26. Id. at 8. Unfortunately, Professor Jones’s narrative falls subject to this criticism:
I want to demonstrate that those with mental illness can have full and satisfying
professional and personal lives, and they need and should not endure stigma or doubt
as to their ability to perform their personal or employment duties. I show this by
pointing out that someone who has a severe bipolar disorder can graduate with high
honors from an elite college preparatory school; earn Phi Beta Kappa at a prestigious
college (graduating with highest distinction) and the Order of the Coif at a top law
school (graduating with distinction), where he served on law review and finished
second in his class; work successfully at a Wall Street law firm; clerk for two federal
judges; be a finalist for a clerkship with the Chief Justice of the United States; practice
law as a member of the United States Supreme Court and Florida Bars; teach at the
University of Chicago Law School; marry successfully; earn tenure and full professor
status by teaching, service, and publication at a law school where no one knew I have a
severe mental illness; and become a nationally known expert on an important social
issue. If that message gets across, and as a result someone is encouraged to reach for
everything in life despite having a mental disease, this article was worth writing and
my “secret” was worth disclosing.
Jones, Walking the Tightrope of Bipolar Disorder, supra note 7, at 373 (emphasis added).
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about those who have succeeded despite a mental illness. 27 I try to
write the “counter-diagnosis” that Price calls for in Mad at School. 28
My mind is, objectively, neither sound nor unsound, but it is the source
of my greatest assets and my greatest deficits in academia. 29 To “cure”
my mind, using the medical paradigm, is to zap me of all of my
strengths.
In Part I of this Article, I describe my own experiences with the
mental health system, as well as how mental illness has affected me in
law school, as a lawyer, and most importantly, as a law professor. In
Part II, I use my own narrative as a lens to analyze Price’s discussion of
the rhetoric of mental illness in higher education. I start with how the
law interacts with mental illness, use that interaction to criticize Price’s
damaging label of “mental disability,” and discuss her analysis of
teaching and learning, collegiality, and productivity. Part III concludes
with a discussion of how we should frame the discourse about mental
illness in legal education. Rhetoric matters, but law, medicine, and
narrative matter as well.
I. MY STORY
Price notes the “proliferation of stories” about mental illness as proof
“of two important truths about disorderly minds. First, such minds
show up all the time, in obvious and not-so-obvious ways; and second,
recognizing their appearance is not a yes-no proposition, but rather a
confusing and contextually dependent process that calls into question
what we mean by the ‘normal’ mind.” 30

I have experienced these truths firsthand, and now I share my story.
A close friend, with no formal training in psychology or psychiatry,
recently diagnosed me with Borderline Personality Disorder (“BPD”), 31
27. See PRICE, supra note 1, at 104 (“I found the references to courage and heroics disturbing,
though not surprising; here was the familiar overcoming narrative, rehearsed yet again.”).
28. Id. at 176−77.
29. Cf. Andrea Sachs, A Memoir of Schizophrenia, TIME (Aug. 27, 2007), http://www.time.
com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1656592,00.html (“‘My mind has been both my best friend and my
worst enemy,’ says [author] Elyn Saks . . . .”).
30. PRICE, supra note 1, at 3−4.
31. The criteria for BPD is as follows:
A pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects,
and marked impulsivity beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of
contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the following:
1. Frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment. Note: Do not include
suicidal or self-mutilating behavior covered in Criterion 5.
2. A pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships characterized by
alternating between extremes of idealization and devaluation.
3. Identity disturbance: markedly and persistently unstable self-image or sense of
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after psychologists and psychiatrists had diagnosed me at various times
over the last twenty years with Dysthymia, Major Depressive Disorder,
Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Panic Disorder, Bipolar Disorder,
Narcissistic Personality Disorder, Dependent Personality Disorder,
Antisocial Personality Disorder, Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD), and
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). 32 While I perhaps
had symptoms of some of these mental “disorders,” I felt as if I was not
being heard, as none of the diagnoses captured how my illness affected
me in the same way as my diagnosis of BPD. For example, a resident in
the mood disorders clinic at one of the largest U.S. research hospitals
continually asked me during an evaluation to define my last “manic”
episode that lasted at least a couple of weeks. I became frustrated that I
could not do so. Nonetheless, the resident and attending psychiatrist
diagnosed me with Bipolar Disorder. When I later spoke to a
psychologist about treatment for BPD, she told me that I was mistaken
about my diagnosis because I was too “bright” to have BPD.
I finally found a psychologist who listened to me, although ironically
she was an unlicensed psychologist who was practicing under her
supervisor’s license. Once I had a diagnosis from my psychologist, I
also found a psychiatrist who established that I had BPD. While I agree
self.
4. Impulsivity in at least two areas that are potentially self-damaging (e.g.,
spending, sex, substance abuse, reckless driving, binge eating). Note: Do not
include suicidal or self-mutilating behavior covered in Criterion.
5. Recurrent suicidal behavior, gestures, or threats, or self-mutilating behavior.
6. Affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood (e.g., intense episodic
dysphoria, irritability, or anxiety usually lasting a few hours and only rarely more
than a few days).
7. Chronic feelings of emptiness.
8. Inappropriate, intense anger or difficulty controlling anger (e.g., frequent
displays of temper, constant anger, recurrent physical fights).
9. Transient, stress-related paranoid ideation or severe dissociative symptoms.
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 6, § 301.83, at 710 (emphases omitted).
32. The diagnosis of mental disorders is very complex and imprecise. Authors Moses and
Barlow have articulated a reason for this:
Possible explanations for these high levels of comorbidity have been reviewed
extensively and include overlapping definitional criteria, varying base rates of
occurrence in different study settings, and a possible sequential relationship among the
disorders such that features of one disorder serve as risk factors for another. Another
possible explanation for this comorbidity is the presence of a “negative affect
syndrome (NAS).” The collective symptoms of emotional disorders have been
theorized as merely variable responses emerging from a more fundamental disorder.
Erica B. Moses & David H. Barlow, A New Unified Treatment Approach for Emotional
Disorders Based on Emotion Science, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 146, 147
(2006) (internal citations omitted). See, e.g., DSM-IV-TR, supra note 6, at 429–84 (discussing the
symptoms and diagnoses of anxiety disorders, including, for example, Generalized Anxiety
Disorder and Panic Disorder).

5_DUHL

2013]

3/9/2013 1:35 PM

Over the Borderline

779

with one commentator that “the DSM-IV is a book of dogma,” 33 which
had failed me for twenty years, I am a casebook study for the symptoms
of BPD. The DSM, while giving my illness a name and thus helping me
feel less isolated and more connected to “patients” who share this
disorder, stigmatizes me by labeling my diagnosis as a “personality
disorder”—a personal indictment of who I am. 34 BPD is an Axis II
diagnosis, which is considered “less treatable and insurable” than
disorders with an Axis I diagnosis, such as depression, bipolarism, and
schizophrenia. 35
To offer some context to my review of Price’s book, I share some of
my experiences with mental illness as a law student, as a lawyer, and as
a law professor.
A. Law School
I began at Harvard Law School in the fall of 1992 after graduating
from Yale College in 1991 and spending a year abroad teaching at a
private boys’ boarding school in Sydney, Australia.
While I
experienced some depression during college and in Australia, I started
at Harvard unaware of my emotional limitations.
Near the middle of my first year, I became disillusioned with my
experience at Harvard Law School. That was not atypical, 36 especially
33. L.J. Davis, The Encyclopedia of Insanity, HARPER’S MAG., Feb. 1997, at 62 (emphasis
omitted).
34. Elise Stobbe articulates this stigmatization:
There may be no other psychiatric diagnosis more laden with stereotypes and stigma
than Borderline Personality Disorder. People who live with this label—the majority
being female—often have problems accessing good mental health services. Unlike the
stigmatization that society puts on mental illness, the stigma associated with BPD often
comes from mental health professionals and their patronizing attitudes. Many
psychiatrists will not treat BPD patients, or they may limit the number of BPD patients
in their practice or drop them as “treatment resistant.” Often attempts to treat
borderlines fail, and some professionals blame the patient for not responding to
treatment. It is often undiagnosed, misdiagnosed, or treated inappropriately.
Elise Stobbe, Psychiatry Discriminates against People with Borderline Personality Disorder,
BRAINBLOGGER.COM (June 20, 2006), http://brainblogger.com/2006/06/20/anti-stigmatizationpsychiatry-discriminates-against-people-with-borderline-personality-disorder/ (internal citations
omitted).
35. What Is an Axis II Disorder?, BPDCENTRAL.COM, http://www.bpdcentral.com/faq/
personality-disorders (last visited July 19, 2012).
36. Two authors have described the feelings they experienced while attending Harvard. First,
Covington and Burling partner Peter Barton Hutt writes:
I remember long talks late at night venting my frustration and arguing about how law
should really be taught to make it interesting and even exciting. I left Harvard Law
School feeling unfulfilled, unsuccessful, and alienated. Nonetheless, those vivid
memories did more to entice me to consider teaching food and drug law at Harvard
than to discourage me. I was intrigued by the challenge of trying to teach law the way
I felt it should have been taught when I was there.
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before Elena Kagan became dean. 37 Most first-year classes were large,
with about 135 students, and as a result, I became alienated from my
classmates, the faculty, and the institution. I still remember the first
question on Duncan Kennedy’s torts exam. This question was the one
he called the “bullshit question”: “Discuss some issue we studied over
the course of the semester.” I thought that much of my first year of
legal education at Harvard was “bullshit.”
During the second semester of my second year, I took the late Phil
Areeda’s antitrust class. Professor Areeda was a “master of the Socratic
method.” 38 On one of the first days of class, as I was trembling in my
chair, he called on me. I had no idea what the answer to his question
was, and he compassionately moved on to another student. Afterward, I
panicked at the thought of going back to his class again—I stopped
going to it, along with the rest of my classes that semester. I became
too depressed to get out of bed except to make my daily trek to Harvard
Square to have a chocolate milkshake at Herrell’s Ice Cream. I did not
think I would finish law school.
I did make it back for my third year. But on the mornings of exams, I
would often feign physical illness because I was too scared to take
them. I finally went to a school psychiatrist who arranged for me to
take my exams in a quiet, separate room, which was actually the makeup room for other students writing exams. He referred me to a therapist
because Harvard Law could not provide the “type” of therapy that I
Peter Barton Hutt, Food and Drug Law: Journal of an Academic Adventure, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC.
1, 1−2 (1996). Furthermore, Kevin Washburn states:
For most of the past fifty years, attending Harvard Law School was a miserable
experience for the majority of its students. The tremendous jubilation on acceptance
quickly soured after students arrived on campus. While some students took the
Harvard experience in stride, recognizing it as the price of admission to the school they
had first learned about in The Paper Chase or One L, many became unhappy during the
first year and stayed that way through the rest of their law school careers. To be sure,
students appreciated the tremendous opportunities that a Harvard law degree provided,
but many were alienated not only from the institution, but even their own classmates,
during their time at the law school. This alienation often continued long after law
school. To meet a recent Harvard Law grad was sometimes to meet an embittered
person who vowed never to give a dime to the institution.
Kevin K. Washburn, Elena Kagan and the Miracle at Harvard, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 67, 67 (2011).
37. See Washburn, supra note 36, at 70−73 (discussing how Kagan transformed the first-year
sections and first-year orientation). After her time as Dean of Harvard Law School, Kagan
became the 45th Solicitor General of the United States, and subsequently, the 100th Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
38. See Clark Byse, In Memoriam: Phillip E. Areeda, 109 HARV. L. REV. 889, 896−97 (1996)
(“[Areeda] was a master of the Socratic method. . . . The essence of [his] approach in teaching . . .
produced tension and anxiety [that eventually evolved into gratitude] for ‘a rigorous and yet
understanding style of teaching.’” (internal quotation marks omitted)). I never got over the
“tension and anxiety” from Areeda’s teaching.
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needed. I wondered at the time, and still wonder now, what that “type”
of therapy was.
One day, I was assigned to be “on call” in my corporations class
during my third year. The thought of having to perform in front of over
100 students terrified me. The professor’s secretary told me that I could
be excused if I had a doctor’s note. I got one, and with notes and madeup illnesses, I “managed” my mental health while at Harvard Law. I
graduated in 1995, but skipped my graduation because I was
disillusioned and alienated by my law school experience.
B. Practicing Law
Between 1995 and 2002, I worked at several different law firms in
either tax or intellectual property litigation. I also spent two years
trying to start my own firm. My tenure at various firms lasted between
six days (my first job out of law school) to eighteen months. I quit jobs
because of some combination of depression, irritability, anxiety, and
boredom. I was fired from one job because I “resisted” the law firm
hierarchy. I was always able to get my next job without much ado
about why I left the previous job. I repeatedly made an “impulsive”
decision and took the “next” job offered. I consistently thought the
problem was with the firms and not with me. At every firm where I
worked, I felt empty and alienated—I found no meaning in the work,
was bored with its tediousness, and did not like the firms’ hierarchical
and undemocratic structures. 39

39. My experience was not atypical. Other authors have similarly addressed this type of
alienation:
Many scholars have commented on the extensive alienation that lawyers experience,
particularly within large law firms. Such alienation can contribute to high levels of
stress and job dissatisfaction. Indeed, many lawyers lament that the practice of law is
merely a business and that the atmosphere of law firm practice is bureaucratically
stifling, leaving many lawyers chronically unfulfilled and discontented. Much of the
alienation that lawyers experience, particularly in larger law firms, stems from the
“proletarian-like” conditions that operate within these firms.
Robert Granfield, The Meaning of Pro Bono: Institutional Variations in Professional Obligations
among Lawyers, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 113, 134 (2007) (citations omitted). Furthermore,
authors Rustad and Koenig comment on the “legal hierarchy”:
Hierarchy remains a significant variable in predicting lawyer happiness for those
excluded from elite law firms. The sifting and sorting of law school applicants into the
different branches of the law is often an arbitrary and inefficient process. MacLeish
suffered existential anxiety because the formalism of law practice stifled his creativity,
just as Stefancic and Delgado’s example of a contemporary law firm associate who
suffers from alienation, wondering “Whatever Happened to That English Major I Used
to Be?”
Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, A Hard Day’s Night: Hierarchy, History & Happiness
in Legal Education, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 261, 314 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
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I knew I could not survive in the legal profession and had reached a
dead end. I was deeply depressed. For six weeks in December 2000
and January 2001, I was hospitalized at the Menninger Clinic, then in
Topeka, Kansas. I participated in the Professionals in Crisis Program, 40
and for the first time, I felt like less of an “outsider.” There were
lawyers, doctors, businesspeople, and academics—educated men and
women with high-paying jobs who had the same struggles with mood
and personality disorders as me. I attended career counseling while in
the program, and the counselor, after administering a battery of tests,
concluded that I should become a “deep sea diver.” I ignored that
advice, but realized that I had always loved teaching. From that point, I
decided to seek a career in which I could combine my passion for
teaching with my background in law.
C. Legal Education
There is a “truism about mental illness, namely, its link to creative
genius. . . . The commonsense link between madness and genius arises
again and again, in stories about real people like composer Robert
Schumann, who is said to have been bipolar . . . .” 41 Much scientific
research suggests that there is a high correlation between creativity and
mood and personality disorders, although the relationship between the
two is complex (i.e., does mental illness cause creativity or does
creativity cause mental illness?). 42 In First-Rate Madness: Uncovering
the Links Between Leadership and Mental Illness, a professor of
40. See Professionals in Crisis Program, MENNINGER CLINIC, http://www.menningerclinic.
com/patient-care/inpatient-treatment/professionals-in-crisis-program (last visited July 20, 2012).
41. PRICE, supra note 1, at 2.
42. See, e.g., Erika Lauronen et al., Links Between Creativity and Mental Disorder, 67
PSYCHIATRY 81, 90–92 (2004) (discussing studies exploring correlations among creative groups,
such as writers, and mental illness). But see Charlotte Waddell, Creativity and Mental Illness: Is
There a Link?, 43 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 166, 166–67 (1988) (“Creativity and mental illness have
long been popularly associated. Until recently, few studies have examined this purported
association using scientific methods. A spate of recent review articles, as well as memoirs of
mental illness by prominent, creative individuals, have coincided with scientific interest in
possible associations between creativity and mental illness. These studies, reviews, and memoirs
have garnered media attention and reinforced popular views that creativity and mental illness are
positively associated. . . . There is a long history of associating creativity and mental illness in
western European cultures, starting with Aristotle, who equated insanity with genius, and
culminating in the “mad genius” controversy of the last two centuries. Many authors have
described famous, creative individuals who reportedly had mental illnesses. Recent accounts in
popular media have touted a link between creativity and various forms of mental illness. The
popularity of asserting connections between creativity and mental illness has also been fueled by
recent memoirs of mental illness by prominent gifted individuals. . . . In summary, much recent
psychiatric and popular literature has enthusiastically promoted an association between creativity
and mental illness. This enthusiasm, however, has not always been balanced with scientific
evidence.” (internal citations omitted)).

5_DUHL

2013]

3/9/2013 1:35 PM

Over the Borderline

783

psychiatry and pharmacology at Tufts Medical Center argues that “the
mad” make the best leaders in times of crisis because of their creativity,
resiliency, empathy, and realism. 43 I strongly believe that my
“abnormal” mind has led to much of my success as a law professor—
the same intense emotions with which I struggle fuel my passion,
energy, and creativity. My “mad” mind is not only a personal liability,
but also a professional asset.
D. Employment and Struggling for Success
The faculty at Temple Law School’s James E. Beasley School of Law
took a chance on me, and for two years I taught as an Honorable
Abraham L. Freedman Teaching Fellow and earned my LL.M. in legal
education. After stops at the Southern Illinois University College of
Law and the University of Tulsa College of Law, I was hired by
William Mitchell College of Law, where I have been teaching for fourand-a-half years. This is the longest I have held any job—the previous
record being two years. I have become more self-aware and focused on
my mental health since I started teaching at William Mitchell, which is
largely why I have been able to maintain my current position.
I regularly receive outstanding teaching evaluations (4.7 to 5.0 out of
5.0 as overall scores), won the Teacher of the Year Award in my first
year at William Mitchell, and have designed cutting-edge and creative
transactional skills classes that combine negotiating and drafting, as
well as a comprehensive pre-orientation workshop. My students
regularly call me “brilliant,” “a wizard,” “demanding,”
“compassionate,” “realistic,” and “creative.” I write scholarly articles in
the areas of commercial law, legal ethics, and legal education, and I am
coauthoring the second edition of a leading bankruptcy text. I am the
Associate Editor-in-Chief of The Business Lawyer, the flagship journal
of the ABA Section of Business Law with a circulation of over 60,000
subscribers. I edit, cite-check, and proofread over 1200 book pages of
manuscript annually. I engage in significant internal service, including
chairing our curriculum committee over the last two years, in which I
spearheaded significant reform of the first-year and skills curricula.
I do not want to belabor my success. My only point is that I am
successful because of my mental illness, not despite my illness. At the
same time, I face extraordinary struggles: frequent mood swings over
the course of a day; feelings of emptiness, abandonment, and low selfesteem; difficulties in interpersonal relationships; self-injurious
43. NASSIR GHAEMI, A FIRST-RATE MADNESS: UNCOVERING THE LINKS BETWEEN
LEADERSHIP AND MENTAL ILLNESS 17–18 (2011).
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behaviors such as cutting and addictions; and even paranoia. I describe
some of these challenges below.
1. Feelings of Abandonment and Emptiness and Difficulty in
Interpersonal Relationships
I spend much of my day in front of the computer responding to
emails, often within minutes. I write, edit, prepare for class, and
communicate with colleagues using my laptop. I am more comfortable
in front of my computer than with face-to-face interactions. When I do
not get any emails for a period of time, I feel abandoned—lost, empty,
and unaware of what to do. I have low self-esteem even when a
successful class or program ends. I look for external sources of
gratification when none exist. The highs often become lows. I focus on
the failures in my life (e.g., the jobs I could not keep) rather than my
successes as a law professor. Mentors become villains, and villains
become mentors. 44 I have such a strong sense of “right” and “wrong”
that people switch on me quickly. I have found, however, that since
entering academia, I am more loyal to those who are aware of my
illness, and they are more loyal to me—hence, my willingness to share
my narrative.
2. Addiction
Last year, I became addicted to benzodiazepines, which has happened
numerous times since law school. My mother had to hide my medicine
from me when I was living at home in my twenties to prevent me from
taking too much. Last fall, I began waking up in the morning shaking
and sweating, overwhelmed with all the work that I had to do. By the
second semester, the thought of teaching caused tremendous anxiety,
despite the fact that I had taught Sales and Secured Transactions over a
half-dozen times each. I lost confidence in myself and no longer
believed I could be a good teacher. For the first few weeks of the
semester, I either cancelled class or taught in a way that manifested my
illness, “in forms ranging from ‘odd’ remarks to lack of eye contact to
repetitious stimming.” 45 Mental impairments are not truly “invisible,”
44. John Cloud further explains this dichotomy:
Borderline patients seem to have no internal governor; they are capable of deep love
and profound rage almost simultaneously. They are powerfully connected to the
people close to them and terrified by the possibility of losing them—yet attack those
people so unexpectedly that they often ensure the very abandonment they fear. When
they want to hold, they claw instead.
John Cloud, The Mystery of Borderline Personality Disorder, TIME (Jan. 8, 2009), http://www.
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1870491,00.html.
45. PRICE, supra note 1, at 18.
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although students ironically are likely to perceive that these behaviors
are a function of eccentricities and not of any illness.
I was already on 45 milligrams of Temazepam (a benzodiazepine)
and 12.5 milligrams of Ambien CR (addictive, similar to
benzodiazepines) when the psychiatric physician assistant I was seeing
prescribed 0.5 to 1 milligram of Xanax to take “as needed.” The pills
provided instant relief—I thought I had found the “magic bullet”—a
feeling that I have had repeatedly over the last twenty years each time I
have tried a new medication. However, I quickly had to take more and
more pills to have the same effect, and I quickly began to use Xanax
even on weekends to sleep and escape from my reality.
Each time that I tried to cut back, I felt more and more anxious, not
knowing whether these feelings stemmed from the original anxiety or
rebound anxiety from not taking enough Xanax. I often became
confused, and my cognitive abilities seemed to slow. I finally saw a
new psychiatrist who told me that I had an addiction. I had become
impulsive in my use of anti-anxiety medications in an attempt to numb
my reality. Although at first she wanted to hospitalize me, she instead
used a Valium taper to help me successfully get off all benzodiazepines
(and the Ambien). Ironically, at least some researchers believe that
benzodiazepines are contraindicated for those with BPD. 46 Where does
the objective truth lie—take the benzodiazepines for anxiety or avoid
them altogether? Even mental health professionals cannot agree. 47
3. Cutting
I have never been suicidal or attempted to commit suicide, although I
often want to crawl into a hole (or bed) and escape. Over the past few
years, I have started to engage in self-mutilating behavior, usually
cutting myself on my arms or legs with a razor or scissors. For
example, I once cut myself when I did not receive a position at my law
school that I believed I was promised, when I was overwhelmed with
46. Robert S. Bobrow, Benzodiazepines Revisited, 20 FAM. PRAC. 347, 348 (2003) (“Patients
with borderline personality disorder are at great risk for dependence, and benzodiazepines are
contraindicated [because BPD patients can become dependent on them].”).
Although
benzodiazepines treat the symptoms of BPD, the higher risk of dependency mitigates their
potential for good for individuals diagnosed with BPD.
47. Compare Jean-Marc Cloos & Valérie Ferreira, Current Use of Benzodiazepines in Anxiety
Disorders, 22 CURRENT OPINION IN PSYCHIATRY 90, 94 (2008) (“The sole use of BZDs in
anxiety disorders, without having tried the alternatives, is to be avoided and . . . are
contraindicated in patients with a history of substance abuse disorder.”), with Theo J.M.
Ingenhoven & Hugo J. Duivenvoorden, Differential Effectiveness of Antipsychotics in Borderline
Personality Disorder, 31 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 489, 489 (2011) (“The American
Psychiatric Association . . . advocates anti-psychotics, antidepressants, mood stabilizers, and
benzodiazepines.”).
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frustration that the law school’s response to the decreasing demand for
legal education was too slow, or when administrators and colleagues
could not distinguish between my mental illness and character “flaws”
and in turn criticized me for manifestations of my illness (e.g., talking
too loudly in class and avoiding conflict). I have “a hard time
regulating, expressing or understanding [my] emotions. Physical injury
distracts [me] from these painful emotions or helps [me] feel a sense of
control over an otherwise uncontrollable situation.” 48
Cutting is a rhetorical device, a communication that I am in
emotional pain. To others it conjures up images of violence, which
feeds into the stereotype that the mentally ill are “dangerous.” It is not
the case that “[p]eople who self-injure are crazy and/or dangerous. . . .
Self-injury is how they cope. Slapping them with a ‘crazy’ or
‘dangerous’ label isn’t accurate or helpful.” 49 Ironically, this rhetorical
device is not effective to the “insider”—frequently after I cut, faculty,
students, and staff notice but ask me how I “fell.” Cutting is part of my
“outsider” narrative.
4. Mood Swings
Every day is like a roller coaster. I go through periods of mania,
anxiety, irritability, and depression, often within the same hour. Those
who know me well find my mood swings unpredictable. I often feel a
sense of mania from a small accomplishment. For example, when I ran
the William Mitchell Fellows Program, a leadership development
program for students with exceptional capacity for leadership in law
school and the legal profession, I felt an immediate “high” when I
successfully recruited a student to William Mitchell. I screamed the
student’s name out of the car window and rewarded myself with ice
cream or coffee. A few minutes after that “high,” I started feeling a
“low,” wondering when or if the next victory would come along.
5. Anger
Anger has plagued me since entering teaching, especially when I feel
as if I have been treated “unjustly.” 50 When I was a visiting professor
at another school, I lost my temper with the associate dean, who had
told me that I could not reschedule classes so that I could go on job
48. Causes, Self-Injury/Cutting, MAYOCLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/selfinjury/DS00775/DSECTION=causes (last visited July 16, 2012).
49. Cutting and Self-Harm, HELPGUIDE.ORG, http://www.helpguide.org/mental/self_injury.
htm (last visited July 16, 2012).
50. See Cloud, supra note 44, at 1 (“What defines borderline personality disorder—and makes
it so explosive—is the sufferers’ inability to calibrate their feelings and behavior. When faced
with an event that makes them depressed or angry, they often become inconsolable or enraged.”).
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interviews. While I was a teaching fellow at Temple, I yelled at a
faculty member who did not inform me about a workshop that I was
supposed to attend. Even at William Mitchell, I often get angry when
“rules” and “processes” are not followed—for example, when tenure
subcommittees are not appointed by the specified date set in the Tenure
Code. My emotions overwhelm me in my quest for “justice,” although
I do not believe my understanding of “justice” is wrong.
6. Paranoia
“Paranoid ideation” is defined as “suspiciousness or a nondelusional
belief that one is being harassed, persecuted, or unfairly treated.” 51
This commonplace definition exposes the subjectivity of the DSM,
despite the notion that its authors have “increas[ingly] adhere[d] to a
model of mental disability as a measurable and biological
phenomenon.” 52 Is it problematic or symptomatic of an illness that one
feels “unfairly treated,” especially when “fairness” is inherently
subjective? For example, in the fall of my third year at William
Mitchell, the dean decided that the “normal” waiting period for tenure
was four-and-half years on the tenure-track, despite the fact that our
Tenure Code states that the “Board of Trustees may consider granting
tenure at any time during a faculty member’s service with William
Mitchell.” 53 As I had been teaching for seven-and-a-half years at that
time with significant scholarship and service, I believed that the dean’s
interpretation was unfair and inconsistent with the black-and-white
language of the Tenure Code. One year later, administrators and
colleagues were still puzzled as to why I felt that I was treated unfairly.
Their reaction, more so than the dean’s initial decision, made me feel as
if I was being “pushed out of the societally defined space of the
‘normal.’” 54
On the subject of paranoia, I obsess over how faculty, staff, and
students perceive me when my symptoms of mental illness are acute. I
usually spend less time at the office, am less focused and responsive,
and worry that those who do not understand mental illness or do not
know that I have a mental illness will judge me “unfairly.” In hindsight,
my reactions are, to some extent, irrational. Yet, at the same time, when

51. NARRIMAN C. SHAHROKH ET AL., THE LANGUAGE OF MENTAL HEALTH, A GLOSSARY OF
PSYCHIATRIC TERMS 183 (2011).
52. PRICE, supra note 1, at 36.
53. WILLIAM MITCHELL COLLEGE OF LAW, FACULTY HANDBOOK 18 (Feb. 2011),
available
at
http://web.wmitchell.edu/mitchellaneous/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/FacultyHandbk-20111.pdf.
54. PRICE, supra note 1, at 29.
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I explained my mental illness to one colleague, she said that she hoped I
returned to “normal” soon, presupposing that there is a “normal” mind.
Likewise, in writing about my accommodations, the dean quite
innocently referred to “flare-ups” of my illness, as if the illness came
and went and was somehow separate from who I am. While my
symptoms do vary from time to time, they are not like a rash that can be
“cured” with a magic balm.
This background has provided a glimpse into my “abnormal” mind. I
now go on to discuss Price’s work without leaving my narrative behind.
II. MAD AT SCHOOL: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN RHETORIC AND THE
LAW
As a professor of English who teaches composition and rhetoric,
Price analyzes “madness” in academic life from the perspective of
rhetoric and academic discourse. As a law professor, the starting point
for my analysis is legal protections for academics with mental illness.
In this Part, I discuss five areas where our analyses overlap: legal
constructs, labels of the mentally impaired, teaching and learning,
productivity, and collegiality.
A. Legal Constructs
The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) has largely failed
college and university faculty with mental disabilities. 55 In a 2003
study, Suzanne Abram found that about ninety-three percent of
“disabled” faculty, including those with mental or physical
impairments, lost their cases under the ADA. 56 As Abram explains,
55. See Susan Stefan, “You’d Have to Be Crazy to Work Here”: Worker Stress, the Abusive
Workplace, and Title I of the ADA, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 795, 805 (1998) (“[J]udicial
assumptions about the nature of psychiatric disabilities and essential employment functions have
resulted in the near-total failure of the ADA to protect individuals with psychiatric disabilities
from employment discrimination.”); Kathleen D. Zylan, Comment, Legislation that Drives Us
Crazy: An Overview of “Mental Disability” under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 31 CUMB.
L. REV. 79, 80 (2001) (“Particularly for the mentally ill, the ADA has failed to prevent
discrimination in the workplace.”). See also supra note 19 and accompanying text (explaining
that the rigid requirements under the ADA prevent many mentally ill individuals from seeking
protection under the statute).
56. Suzanne Abram, The Americans with Disabilities Act in Higher Education: The Plight of
Disabled Faculty, 32 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 5−6 (2003). Abram articulates:
When faculty sue their employers for alleged disability discrimination, they fare no
better than plaintiffs in non-academic lawsuits. By far, the majority of college and
university instructors who sue under the ADA lose their cases. Worse yet, they lose
them at the summary judgment stage. Since the standard for summary judgment is the
absence of any genuine issue of material fact, or the inability of a reasonable jury to
find for the plaintiff, it is particularly ominous that disabled faculty lose their cases at
this early stage in the litigation, without obtaining the opportunity to put their cases
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In short, courts have demonstrated a proclivity to dismiss ADA
actions brought by disabled, or allegedly disabled, professors. The
actions often fail because the faculty members cannot walk the fine
line between being disabled enough and being too disabled. A
disabled professor must construct his complaint so that he is
demonstrably able to perform the essential functions of his position
with reasonable accommodation and yet not so disabled that he is
unable to perform his duties with accommodation. In the majority of
cases, the plaintiff professors seem unable to place themselves within
this narrow range. 57

Price glosses over one of the biggest hurdles that “mad” faculty must
overcome to succeed in ADA claims: they must prove that they have a
“disability” covered by the Act. 58 A person with a “disability” is one
who: “(A) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) has a record of
such impairment; or (C) is being regarded as having such an
impairment.” 59 While the ADA expressly includes “working” as a
major life activity, 60 “[u]nder case law, being unable to perform a
single, particular job [e.g., that of a tenure-track or tenured academic] is
not generally considered a substantial limitation on the major life
activity of working.” 61
While the faculty member with ADD or ADHD might be
substantially limited in the major life activity of “concentrating,” 62 or
the academic with a learning disability substantially limited in the major
life activity of “learning” or “reading,” 63 the borderline or bipolar
before a jury.
Id. (footnote omitted). Authors Rothstein and Irzyk discuss the issue of tenure with respect to
disabilities:
In some cases, faculty have argued that their denial of promotion or tenure has been
related to a disability. The courts have generally found, however, that even if a
disability is related to inadequate performance in the area of teaching or scholarship, it
does not excuse performance standards. In most cases, the courts are finding that the
institution’s action was based on nonperformance, not on the disability.
LAURA ROTHSTEIN & JULIA IRZYK, DISABILITIES AND THE LAW § 3:26, at 334−35 & n.2 (4th ed.
2012).
57. Abram, supra note 56, at 11. Abram’s study, of course, could not account for faculty with
claims under the ADA who never brought their cases to court.
58. See ROTHSTEIN & IRZYK, supra note 56, § 4:9, at 414 & n.30 (“Mental impairments as a
disability are complex. They are often difficult to diagnose, and there are also concerns about
danger to self or others.”).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2006).
60. Id. § 12102(2).
61. ROTHSTEIN & IRZYK, supra note 56, § 4.8, at 396 n.62 (citing cases).
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(A) (defining “concentrating” as a major life activity).
Inattentiveness is a common symptom of ADD or ADHD.
63. See id. (identifying learning and reading as major life activities). Individuals with learning
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faculty member faces high hurdles in showing that he or she qualifies
under the ADA’s definition of “disability.” 64 For example, courts are
unlikely to view “interacting with others” as a “major life activity”
when asserted by an individual with a mental impairment. 65 Because
the ADA approaches “disability” from a medical model, focusing on the
actual impairment itself, the “normal” person might not understand how
the mentally impaired academic is “substantially limited” in a major life
activity. 66 However, from the psychosocial model that Price and I

disabilities experience difficulties with both.
64. See Ramona L. Paetzold, How Courts, Employers, and the ADA Disable Persons with
Bipolar Disorder, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 293, 314 (2005). Paetzold describes these
hurdles:
In addition, [bipolar disorder] is easily doubted because its manifestations are often
behaviors that everyone believes they have experienced. It is easy to say that all
people have good days and bad days; all people have periods of elation and periods of
irritability; all people have days that they cannot concentrate versus days when mental
abilities seem stronger; and all people have periods during which they exercise poor
judgment. People with [bipolar disorder] may thus be dismissed as merely
hypersensitive, more emotional, lacking in self-regulation, or engaging in greater levels
of self-promotion. What are missing from this construction are the extremes that
persons with [bipolar disorder] experience, their lack of ability to control the extreme
moods and concurrent experiences, their risk of suicide, the progression of their
disorder, and the debilitation that they suffer as a result of the devastation done to their
lives.
Id. I have often been dismissed by administrators and colleagues as “hypersensitive,”
“overemotional,” and “self-promotional.”
65. Wendy F. Hensel, Interacting with Others: A Major Life Activity under the Americans
with Disabilities Act?, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1139, 1142 (describing that these cases reveal a
disturbing trend: “Although the Supreme Court has strongly indicated that courts must evaluate
whether an activity is ‘major’ by looking to the activity’s significance to the population generally
rather than to the claimant specifically, the pattern in several cases suggests the contrary is
occurring.”). Furthermore:
Courts appear far more likely to recognize interacting with others as a major life
activity, or a significant component of an established major life activity, when asserted
by an individual with a physical, rather than mental, impairment. Likewise, cases
stemming from an individual’s inability to interact with others as a result of other
people’s unsubstantiated prejudices concerning physical ability, rather than any
specific individual action, are viewed favorably by courts. In sharp contrast, where
interacting with others is asserted by an individual with a psychiatric impairment
involved in questionable behavior in the workplace, courts are far less likely to
recognize this activity as “major,” even when the individual’s inability to interact
effectively is a result of group harassment and exclusion.
Id. (footnotes omitted). For example, the Tenth Circuit—in granting summary judgment to an
employer following an employee’s claim alleging a hostile work environment—determined that
the employee was not limited in his ability to sleep, walk, or interact with others and was not
regarded as disabled. See Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 2001).
66. See Paetzold, supra note 64, at 324 (explaining that courts’ analysis of major life activities
sometimes focuses too much on physical limitations rather than the issues confronted by an
individual with BPD).
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favor, 67 “‘disabilities’ result from situations that are themselves
disabling.” 68 From this perspective, and not from the perspective of a
“normal” person (including some judges), it is easier to understand how
mentally impaired academics can be “substantially limited” in the major
life activities of working, 69 concentrating, or thinking, and why
“interacting with others” should be considered a major life activity.
Maybe a court would even recognize “that having the capability to live
one’s life for some stable period of time without unpredictable and
sometimes extreme mood swings may be a major life activity.” 70
To qualify for protection under the ADA, a faculty member must be
“otherwise qualified” to perform the “essential requirements” or
functions of the job, “taking into account reasonable accommodations
that could be provided.” 71 Price notes the potential clash between the
directive to provide “reasonable accommodations” and “the faculty
member’s burden to show that he or she can perform the ‘essential
functions’ of the job.” 72 If academic institutions define “essential
functions” too narrowly, they unnecessarily risk the exclusion of faculty
members with mental impairments. 73 I know firsthand the difficulty in
67. See PRICE, supra note 1, at 19 (“My appreciation of psychosocial has been affirmed by
philosopher Cal Montgomery . . . .”).
68. Paetzold, supra note 64, at 320. Paetzold observed:
Thus, from a social model perspective, the level of impairment experienced by a
person with [bipolar disorder] is determined in part by the physical layout of the work
area, interactions with supervisors, interactions with coworkers, the general culture
within the work team or organizational group, general attitudes and behaviors within
the work environment, flexibility in manner and time of working, and the nature of the
task.
Id.
69. See id. at 369 (“The issue is not whether the employee with [bipolar disorder] is restricted
from performing an entire class of jobs, or even a broad range of jobs within a class, but whether
work circumstances are disabling her so that she cannot perform this job. If so, then the
organization should be expected to make reasonable accommodations to assist her in performing
the job. If this is not the standard, people with [bipolar disorder] will be excluded from American
workplaces and will not be able to live independently as part of the larger society.”).
70. Id. at 368.
71. ROTHSTEIN & IRZYK, supra note 56, § 4.10, at 420−21 & n.2 (citing Se. Cmty. Coll. v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 407 (1979)).
72. PRICE, supra note 1, at 108.
73. See, e.g., Darcangelo v. Verizon Md., Inc., 189 F. App’x 217, 218 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding
that bipolar employee did not qualify under the ADA because she could not interact with
coworkers, an “essential function” of the employee’s position). In defining the position’s
“essential functions,” the court relied on the defendant’s code of conduct, which “directs
employees to be ‘respectful, cooperative, and helpful toward customers, suppliers, our coworkers, employees and the general public’ and to refrain from acting in ‘an abusive, threatening,
discriminatory, harassing or obscene manner toward any employee or others with whom we come
in contact during the course of business.’” Id.
Paetzold further describes the issue of disability within the context of employment:

5_DUHL

792

3/9/2013 1:35 PM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 44

getting reasonable accommodations for mental illness. 74 I have
struggled to get the primary accommodations that I have requested—
written job responsibilities with significant advance notice of teaching
and service obligations. I have been asked that my doctor provide a list
of “work restrictions,” rhetoric suggesting that I could not perform
certain functions of my job. To the contrary, I perform all of the
functions of my job but need reasonable accommodations to do so.
Price makes two wrong moves in criticizing the ADA and how courts
have applied it. She questions whether the “essential functions” of the
job of a law professor should change to accommodate faculty with
disabilities: “For example, what if a professor who has agoraphobia or
panic disorder must miss classes on an unpredictable basis. Does the
burden lie on him to find a substitute, no matter how short the notice or
distressing the situation that gave rise to his absence in the first

Employers should not be able to rely on stereotypical beliefs about the personal
failings or other unsuitability of a person with [bipolar disorder] in establishing the
essential job functions. For example, by saying that “getting along with others” is an
essential job function, it could be that employers are thinking that employees who
cannot perform this function are simply deficient as people and could never be good
employees or perhaps that they would introduce workplace conflict. Employers could
also be reflecting on their own lack of experience and ideas regarding trying to
accommodate interpersonal interactions, i.e., their inability to think “outside of the
box.” Courts must place a stronger burden on employers to justify their choices for
essential job functions so as not to discriminate against persons with [bipolar disorder].
....
. . . Although all job functions can be manipulated to have negative consequences for
persons with [bipolar disorder], those requiring subjective assessment may leave far
too much to employer discretion. Being friendly and getting along with others are
subjectively evaluated job functions that are problematic because they are relatively
incapable of objective measurement. It will always be difficult to know when the level
of performance of such job functions is acceptable.
Paetzold, supra note 64, at 370−71.
74. On the issue of accommodation, Paetzold opines that:
It may be difficult for the employee with [bipolar disorder] to articulate precisely how
she is impaired or what she may need to assist her in doing her job effectively. Placing
a greater burden on the employer to initiate the process, provide suggestions,
communicate with doctors (with the employee’s permission), show patience, and
generally facilitate the process would help to allow employees with [bipolar disorder]
to remain in the workplace.
Id. at 365−66. Price additionally notes that:
[R]equests for accommodations for psychiatric disabilities are “routinely deemed per
se unreasonable by reviewing courts.” Such accommodations include working at
home, being transferred away from certain coworkers or supervisors, or modification
of standards for behavior. In short, not only are workers with mental disabilities likely
to be considered a threat, and thus unqualified for employment, but their requests for
accommodations are likely to be deemed “unreasonable.”
PRICE, supra note 1, at 111 (internal citations omitted).
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place?” 75 To the extent that teaching classes regularly is an “essential
function” of a law professor (which it should be), the professor who
regularly and unpredictably misses classes (even with reasonable
accommodations) is not fulfilling that function and should not receive
protection under the ADA. To suggest otherwise is to suggest that
faculty with mental impairments are less capable than faculty without
impairments, which pushes faculty like me unwillingly “out of the
societally defined space of the ‘normal.’” 76
Price’s second wrong move is to confuse the reader about the effect
of the 2008 ADA amendments. She is correct that the “Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission states that disability should be
defined without consideration of ‘medicines.’” 77 That has been the
state of the law since the amendments were passed. 78 However, she
then claims (as if it were the current law) that “several judgments in
1999 and following found that an individual’s qualification for [being]
disabled should be assessed in a ‘corrected,’ that is, ‘medicated’
state.” 79 Those cases, which were decided before the amendments, are
clear in stating that mitigating measures, such as medication, should not
be taken into account when considering whether a disability imposes a
“substantial limitation.” 80
B. Naming
To refer to academics with mental impairments, Price writes,
“[T]hese days I’m using mental disability. . . . [T]his term can include
75. PRICE, supra note 1, at 108. Price provides an example:
In [Horton v. Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508], the professor
claimed to have an “unspecified nervous disorder” and missed time from teaching.
The court ruled that since the “essential functions” of a community college professor’s
job are to “prepare, attend, and teach classes,” and his disorder caused him to miss
class, he did not qualify. . . . If presence is considered an essential function of an
academic position, and presence is defined in terms of one’s fleshy appearance in a
classroom, then many faculty members with mental disabilities are de facto not
qualified for their jobs.
Id. at 112 (internal citations omitted).
76. PRICE, supra note 1, at 29. See id. (“[Disability Studies] concerns itself with human
difference, and emphasizes the ways that people with disabilities are ostracized, medicalized,
heroized, and otherwise pushed out of the societally defined space of the ‘normal.’ . . .
[Disability Studies] has a long history of interest in the ways that language is used to construct
formations of power and difference.”).
77. Id. at 110.
78. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12-102(E)(i) (West 2012) (stating that the determination of whether an
impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without considering factors
such as medication). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(v) (2012) (indicating that a medical analysis
is not required; however, the presentation of such an analysis is not prohibited).
79. PRICE, supra note 1, at 110.
80. ROTHSTEIN & IRZYK, supra note 56, § 4.8, at 398 nn.68−71.
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not only madness, but also cognitive and intellectual dis/abilities of
various kinds.” 81 While “mental disability” is perhaps accurate for the
student with dyslexia, ADHD, or autism, I disagree with Price’s choice
of labels for “mad” academics with a myriad of mood and personality
disorders for three reasons.
First, part of the problem with the term “disability” is that it presumes
an inability to do things that a “normal” person can do. This stance
ignores the fact that what an individual can or cannot do often depends
on the social context 82—e.g., an academic environment—and the fact
that faculty members with mental impairments are often able to do
everything a “normal” faculty member can do, with medication,
support, workplace flexibility, and other reasonable accommodations.
Labeling me as “disabled” suggests I am incompetent, which I am not.
On the contrary, I have been able to exceed expectations in the
“essential functions” of my current job.
Second, the word “disability” demands diagnostic and objective
precision, which Price abhors. As she states, “[p]sychiatric discourse
positions itself as natural, scientific, and objective, a system through
which human minds may be reliably measured as ‘crazy’ or ‘normal,’
and through which human bodies can therefore be sorted into their
appropriate spaces: the educational institution or the mental
institution.” 83 When a faculty member has received multiple and
conflicting diagnoses, and has a myriad of mental health symptoms,
how can we define his or her impairment? I would not begin to know
how to describe my mental “disability,” and neither medicine nor
science has been any more successful. Once we use the term “mental
disability,” we devalue the individual experience.
Last, and most important from my perspective, the term “disability”
buys into the ADA’s legal constructs. This is problematic for the
faculty member who has a mental impairment (but does not qualify for
protection under the ADA) because there is a risk of altogether
delegitimizing his or her impairment. The ADA also does not
adequately protect academics with mental illness. 84 Faculty members
with mental impairments have to work outside of the confines of the
ADA—whether through narrative and rhetoric, democratic institutional

81. PRICE, supra note 1, at 19.
82. See supra notes 66−70 and accompanying text (describing the psychosocial model for
approaching “disability,” which involves analyzing situations that result in disabilities).
83. PRICE, supra note 1, at 33.
84. See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text (explaining how the ADA has not protected
academics from employment discrimination).
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governance, or legislative or grassroots advocacy 85—to ensure equal
participation in academic life. The term “mental disability” hampers
this effort because, to a large extent, “mad” faculty members with
“disabilities” have a safe haven under the ADA and are included as
equal participants in academic life; those without “disabilities” under
the ADA are often excluded. To break free of the ADA as a construct
to define who is “able” and who is “disabled,” we need to break free
from the term “mental disability.”
I prefer the term “mental illness.” Illness can incorporate a host of
diagnoses and symptoms, and does not carry with it the baggage that the
mentally ill academic might be incompetent in performing his or her
job. Price criticizes this term:
Mental illness introduces a discourse of well/unwellness into the
notion of madness; its complement is mental health, the term of
choice for the medical community as well as insurance companies and
social support services. The unwell/well paradigm has many
problems, particularly its implication that a mad person needs to be
“cured” by some means. 86

While I agree with Price’s critique to some extent, many mental
illnesses are chronic (as are many physical illnesses like cancers and
autoimmune disorders), and there is no expectation that they will be
“cured.” Additionally, the term “mental illness” does not have to be
defined naturally, scientifically, or objectively, but, unrestrained by the
ADA, can be defined subjectively in light of the “mad” academic’s
individual symptoms and experiences. Admittedly, however, there are
problems with any term used to describe “madness.” Just as “illness”
might suggest temporariness or an impairment that can be cured,
“disability” suggests permanence or an impairment that cannot be
mitigated or ameliorated.
C. Teaching and Learning
My own experiences with mental illness at Harvard Law greatly
inform my teaching. Price organizes her discussion of teaching and
learning within three constructs: presence and absence, participation and
discussion, and resistance. I do the same.
A

student

1. Presence and Absence
physically present in class is

not

necessarily

85. For an example of an organization that fosters grassroots advocacy to overcome the stigma
of mental illness, see BRING CHANGE 2 MIND, http://www.bringchange2mind.org (last visited
Jan. 11, 2013).
86. PRICE, supra note 1, at 12.
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“experiencing” the class. 87 Conversely, a student not physically present
in class may “experience” the class: “A student with social anxiety, or
[a disorder falling] on the autism spectrum, for example, might get a
great deal more out of the learning process that does not involve close
contact or interaction with others.” 88 I learned best in law school by
reading text; I often did not attend class when not required to do so, yet
did well in the courses that I did not regularly attend. Students’
disabilities may play a role in the students’ physical presence in class, 89
and therefore, I do not require attendance in my doctrinal classes and
provide students many other ways to learn. As an example, I post
copies of all of my class notes online.
Of course, students can be absent from class for reasons unrelated to
a mental impairment—they might be unmotivated or disinterested
(which, of course, could be related to mental illness), have a conflicting
commitment (e.g., a job, family, moot court competition, etc.), or be
physically ill. Consequently, I take attendance and reach out to any
students who consistently miss class, offering pastoral advice and
academic assistance. In my transactional skills classes, however, I
require students to attend class and participate—students’ learning is
thwarted without active attendance and participation (e.g., as a client,
co-counsel, or opposing counsel). In a law school, students need to
learn how to keep professional obligations despite their disabilities, 90
and I try to provide safer places 91 for them to do so (e.g., reaching out
to a seemingly anxious student in a negotiation for one-on-one
coaching, or encouraging students to take a break on their own to gather
their thoughts). Ironically, students in these classes often talk to my coteachers and me about issues related to their mental health, partly
because of the intense interactions and critical self-reflection that we
require.

87. Id. at 66.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 65 (explaining that some studies of classroom attendance erroneously ignore that
disabled students may face barriers to physically attending class).
90. Many commentators have described the importance of teaching law students
professionalism. See, e.g., Douglas S. Lang, The Role of Law Professors: A Critical Force in
Shaping Integrity and Professionalism, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 509, 512 (2001) (“Although law
professors could easily set law students on the track towards honest, ethical and professional
behavior in the practice of law, many professors refuse to act.”).
91. See PRICE, supra note 1, at 100−01 (discussing “safe houses,” which are defined as “social
and intellectual spaces where groups can constitute themselves . . . with high degrees of trust,
shared understandings, [and] temporary protection from legacies of oppression” (citations
omitted)).
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2. Participation and Discussion
I do not use the Socratic method or cold-call on students; every time I
think about doing so, I am brought back to my experience in Professor
Areeda’s antitrust class. The Socratic method can alienate or silence
students who identify with “outsider” groups. 92 I give students many
opportunities to participate through “multimodal communication” 93—in
class, they work individually, in pairs, and in groups; can work on
written assignments by themselves or with classmates; receive
information in writing, verbally, and visually; and can communicate
with me by email or in person. 94 I also ask groups of students to
92. See, e.g., Jennifer Jolly-Ryan, Disabilities to Exceptional Abilities, Law Students with
Disabilities, Nontraditional Learners, and the Law Teacher as a Learner, 6 NEV. L.J. 116,
124−25 (2005) (“Scholars now criticize the Socratic Method as a primary teaching tool, despite
its long reign in law schools. It is ineffective for most types of learners. Some scholars describe
it as ‘mystifying and patriarchal, persisting because of large classes and professors too lazy to
adopt new teaching methods.’ It has been particularly ineffective for teaching women, minorities,
and students with a wide variety of learning styles. However, law professors cling to the Socratic
Method as their primary teaching tool.” (footnotes omitted)); Benjamin V. Madison, III, The
Elephant in Law School Classrooms: Overuse of the Socratic Method as an Obstacle to Teaching
Modern Law Students, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 293, 301 (2008) (“Does the unwillingness to
embrace methods to complement the Socratic method actually represent an unhealthy elitism?
Evidence suggests that the large-class Socratic format discourages participation of many students,
particularly women and minorities. If women and minorities do not benefit from the pureSocratic approach, we ought to ask ourselves whether professors are ironically perpetuating a
subtle form of discrimination by their insistence upon a purely Socratic classroom.” (footnote
omitted)); Jennifer L. Rosato, The Socratic Method and Women Law Students: Humanize, Don’t
Feminize, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 37, 37−38 (1997) (“Complaints have been
leveled against the Socratic Method of law teaching for many years. Notwithstanding these
complaints, the Socratic Method continues to be the primary pedagogy used by law school
teachers. Renewed concerns about the continued use of this teaching method have been raised by
recent studies that address its effect on women law students. The results of these studies are
overwhelmingly negative: they conclude that the Socratic Method alienates, oppresses,
traumatizes and silences women.” (footnotes omitted)).
93. See PRICE, supra note 1, at 96−98 (discussing “multimodal communication,” or
implementing a variety of modes and styles of communication).
94. Students should be exposed to varying types of communication both because they have
diverse learning styles and because they will be required to communicate in different ways as
lawyers. Professor Alaka describes the need for this type of learning:
Similarly, regardless of whether one self-identifies as a visual, auditory, kinesthetic,
or tactile learner, lawyers regularly use each of those modalities in practice. They
process information by reading and synthesizing legal authority and documents
obtained during discovery, for example, and act on oral directives from clients, judges,
and colleagues. As professional writers, lawyers create myriad types of documents,
including those that reflect their analysis of the law, their understanding of clients’
goals, and their informed strategic choices. Although personality might ultimately
determine a lawyer’s career choices and, thus, the frequency with which she engages in
particular activities, lawyers need to develop the ability to obtain and use information
across the spectrum of identified modalities.
Aϊda M. Alaka, Learning Styles: What Difference Do the Differences Make?, 5 CHARLESTON L.
REV. 133, 167−68 (2011). See also Robin Boyle & Rita Dunn, Teaching Law Students through
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prepare problem sets and discuss the assigned problems in class. I
emphasize ongoing feedback, including positive feedback and
encouragement of students, 95 comments on drafts of student work, and
opportunities for students to provide me feedback on the class. 96
3. Resistance
My classroom is unorthodox. I stand on desks, yell, make selfdeprecating jokes, tell stories, and have even been known to take a
student’s water bottle and dump it out on the floor (to illustrate the tort
of conversion). Consequently, the norms in my classroom are flexible,
inclusive, and appeal to students with a variety of learning styles and
backgrounds. I view student resistance flexibly, and “seek to include
disruption of [my] own classroom-based agendas as part of the learning
process.” 97 For example, I taught an intensive one-week simulation
class, and students were near mutiny after staying up all night to

Individual Learning Styles, 62 ALB. L. REV. 213, 223 (1998) (“A growing number of law
professors agree that students do not all learn the same way. This leads to the conclusion that
more emphasis on individual learning styles should be explored at the law school level.”
(footnote omitted)). Furthermore, “[b]ecause all students do not learn the same way, law
professors should avoid adopting an across-the-board teaching method.” Id.
95. Faculty members should give students prompt feedback, including positive feedback. See
Gerald F. Hess, Heads and Hearts: The Teaching and Learning Environment in Law School, 52 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 75, 106 (2002) (“The importance of formative feedback for student learning cannot
be overestimated. Prompt feedback has a clear positive relationship to student achievement and
satisfaction. Frequent positive feedback helps students become self-motivated, independent
learners.”); Christine Ver Ploeg & Jim Hilbert, Project-Based Learning and ADR Education: One
Model for Teaching ADR Students to Problem Solve for Real, 11 APPALACHIAN J.L. 157, 182
(2012) (“So little of law school is spent on providing feedback, and this is an important time for
the students to feel good about their work. Typically, the clients are extremely happy about the
work product, so it can be fun to debrief the students on the clients’ satisfaction.” (footnote
omitted)). However, in order for this feedback to become “real,” “faculty could actually go
around the room and tell each student individually what particular contributions were valuable,
thereby providing both positive feedback and public acknowledgement.” Id.
96. See PRICE, supra note 1, at 96 (discussing the provision of feedback). Joan Catherine
Bohl has described the issue of feedback with respect to current generations:
This characteristic has particular significance for Gen X Y students, who learn best
when they are actively engaged with the material. A key part of active engagement,
and of participation in the classroom, is the give and take of feedback between
professor and student. Feedback—like frequent opportunities for evaluation—
confirms to students that they have grasped the concepts involved. With this
confirmation, they can progress through the learning process in the small steps their
life experiences have taught them to expect. Since their technology-laced experience
has conditioned them to receive information in small, discrete portions, rather than
engaging in a lengthy process of learning with results deferred, frequent evaluation can
enhance the learning process directly.
Joan Catherine Bohl, Generations X and Y in Law School: Practical Strategies for Teaching the
“MTV/Google” Generation, 54 LOY. L. REV. 775, 785 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
97. PRICE, supra note 1, at 79−80.
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complete research memos. I used this experience both to encourage
students to reflect critically on what they learned and for me to reflect
on how I could give feedback to boost the students’ enthusiasm and
reduce the workload for the remainder of the week. I welcome students
to “interrupt the conventional script of classroom discourse” 98 as long
as they do so civilly and professionally. I often interrupt that
“conventional script” myself, by, for example, leading a mindfulness or
relaxation exercise in the middle of class.
D. Productivity
As Price notes, we “continue to think of the prototypical faculty
member as a three-trick pony, equally skilled in research, teaching, and
service.” 99 In response to this traditional conception of “productivity,”
Price asks two pertinent questions:
The first question is[:] What is the nature of the thing? In other
words, what in fact are the essential functions of work as a faculty
member? . . . The second question is[:] What is the quality of the
thing? In other words, how good is the faculty member’s performance
in teaching, scholarship, service (and perhaps collegiality)? 100

Critics of legal education have argued that law schools should
redistribute resources away from scholarship and toward student
learning and development. 101 Law schools are beginning to rethink the
98. Id. at 79.
99. Id. at 136.
100. Id. at 107.
101. See Lauren Carasik, Renaissance or Retrenchment: Legal Education at a Crossroads, 44
IND. L. REV. 735, 767 (2011) (arguing that a way to justify fewer full-time faculty is based on the
lack of utility “of increasingly esoteric faculty scholarship” that law students finance, but from
which they derive no real benefit). Instead, “the money spent supporting law professors to
produce scholarship could be better spent providing direct benefits to the students who finance
those salaries.” Id. See also Mary A. Lynch, An Evaluation of Ten Concerns about Using
Outcomes in Legal Education, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 976, 985 (2012) (“Some legal
education reformers maintain that resources in legal education have been disproportionately
weighted towards scholarship goals and away from professional development of students. They
argue for what they see as a ‘fairer’ distribution of resources.” (footnote omitted)); Brent E.
Newton, Preaching What They Don’t Practice: Why Law Faculties’ Preoccupation with
Impractical Scholarship and Devaluation of Professional Competencies Obstruct Reform in the
Legal Academy, 62 S.C. L. REV. 105, 154−55 (2010) (finding unacceptable that a substantial
portion “of the tuition that law students pay currently serves as a cross-subsidy that allows
professors to spend most of their time researching and writing impractical law review articles
rather than effectively teaching students the knowledge, skills, and professional values they will
need to be competent (and employable) lawyers”). Instead, Newton proposes that schools strike a
healthier balance between their functions as both “learning institutions and producers of legal
scholarship.” Id. at 155. Because of the latter’s current dominance over the former, schools have
“mostly impractical law faculties [that] must cease before [certain] pedagogical and curricular
reforms . . . can be realized. The professoriate must practice before it preaches.” Id. (footnotes
omitted).
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role of faculty, 102 and some proponents of reform argue that law school
faculty should focus either on teaching or scholarship. 103 As Price
argues, a “key structural shift that would benefit not only faculty with
mental disabilities, but all faculty . . . would be a radical reconfiguration
of the research-teaching-service triad, with a proliferation of differently
structured positions according to [institutional] need, ability, and
desire.” 104
If we were to rethink the role of faculty, we could reexamine the role
of the faculty member’s “presence” in the classroom. 105 Law schools
are beginning to shift more resources to online teaching and learning to
increase access to legal education. 106 To the extent online teaching and
learning further pedagogical objectives, such as appealing to different
learning styles 107 and achieving certain learning outcomes, 108 faculty
102. See John O. Sonsteng et al., Legal Education Renaissance: A Practical Approach for the
Twenty-First Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 303, 467 (2007) (“[We should determine the]
appropriate role of faculty, while taking into account the impact of cost on individual students,
the established educational objectives, the necessary balance between the faculty’s role in
education and scholarship, and the extent to which a particular faculty structure requires students
to find crucial training outside the law school.” (footnote omitted)).
103. As an example, Newton proposes some alternatives:
First, law schools should create two types of tenure-track professorships, “research”
professors and “teaching” professors, with equal opportunities in the tenure-track
system (although evaluated differently for tenure), equitable voting rights in faculty
governance, and equivalent salaries. Unlike the current system, which routinely
assigns the bulk of teaching responsibilities to faculty members who have been hired to
be impractical scholars, the proposed system would permit a certain segment of the
faculty, at most one-third, to focus on what they do best: theoretical, interdisciplinary
research and scholarship. Such research professors, only a small percentage with both
a Ph.D. and a law degree, would carry lesser teaching loads than teaching professors,
and in addition would only teach courses in their areas of expertise (e.g., statistics and
econometrics for lawyers).
Newton, supra note 101, at 148−49 (footnotes omitted).
104. PRICE, supra note 1, at 137.
105. See id. at 112 (“Here we see the problem of presence, explored in terms of students’
experience in chapter 2, affecting faculty members as well.”).
106. See, e.g., Gregory M. Duhl, Equipping Our Lawyers: Mitchell’s Outcomes-Based
Approach to Legal Education, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 906, 943–44 (2012) (“Online and
blended courses increase access for students, especially nontraditional students . . . . We need
more courses that are fully online, especially bar courses, which enable students to complete
externships in rural parts of Minnesota . . . .”).
107. See David P. Diaz & Ryan B. Cartnal, Students’ Learning Styles in Two Classes: Online
Distance Learning and Equivalent On-Campus, 47 C. TEACHING 130, 135 (1999) (concluding
that information about the different learning styles of participating students should impact the
style and structure of the “distance education environment,” or online courses).
108. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES IN ONLINE
LEARNING: A META-ANALYSIS AND REVIEW OF ONLINE LEARNING STUDIES 18 (2010),
available at http://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/tech/evidence-based-practices/finalreport.pdf (“The
overall finding of the meta-analysis is that classes with online learning (whether taught
completely online or blended) on average produce stronger student learning outcomes than do
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members, such as professors who suffer from panic disorder, could be
“present” in the classroom without making a “fleshy appearance.” 109
Likewise, the faculty member who, like me, feels awkward and
uncomfortable at conferences, 110 could discuss his or her work through
blogs, emails, and peer exchange or feedback. 111
There remains one caveat. While the experiences and perspectives of
“mad” faculty can provide the answers to Price’s questions, particularly
because we can relate to students with different learning styles and
dis/abilities, we should define the “essential functions” of a professor in
the context of institutional needs. Price starts with the premise that
some “mad” faculty members cannot fulfill the “essential functions” of
a professor as traditionally defined, and then argues that all faculty
could benefit from a reconceptualization of faculty “productivity.” 112
Her rhetorical move undercuts the “outsider” narrative; we have more
credibility to advocate for institutional change if we are “competent” as
measured by current institutional norms.
The converse of Price’s concern as to whether mentally ill faculty
members can fulfill the “essential functions” of their jobs is the risk that
they be held to a higher “productivity” standard than “normal” faculty.
For example, the Faculty Handbook at my law school states:
To be granted and retain tenure, faculty members at William Mitchell
are expected to demonstrate competent and professional performance
in four areas: (1) teaching; (2) scholarship; (3) service; and (4)
complying with the standards of professional conduct. Each of these
areas is among the essential functions of the position of a faculty

classes with solely face-to-face instruction.”); Gary A. Munneke, Managing a Law Practice:
What You Need to Learn in Law School, 30 PACE L. REV. 1207, 1245 (2010) (“Just as legal
services are no longer bound by the four walls of the law office, education without walls is not
only feasible, but desirable. Without denigrating the value of face-to-face contact, distance
learning, like distance representation of clients, provides opportunities to enhance and expand the
scope of communications.”).
109. PRICE, supra note 1, at 112.
110. Cf. PRICE, supra note 1, at 121−29 (discussing “productivity” and “collegiality” in the
context of academic conferences).
111. Price gives an example:
I’m delighted to give and receive directly voice feedback when I can; however, being
queer and mentally disabled myself, I can well understand that silence may be the most
empowering strategy that one has available at a given time. For this reason we—
faculty, administrators, and public advocates—must understand that feedback comes in
many forms.
PRICE, supra note 1, at 131.
112. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (describing how academic institutions may
narrowly define “essential functions” in a way that excludes faculty members with mental
impairments).
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member at William Mitchell. Faculty members must demonstrate
overall competent and professional performance. 113

Despite this language, some of our faculty members do not engage in
scholarship, for example. As a mentally ill faculty member, I could be
held to a higher standard than “normal” faculty members because I must
show I can fulfill the “essential functions” of my job. Two higher
education lawyers recommend that institutions “[m]ake sure that
workload policies and practices are clear and are followed consistently,
documenting any deviations from standard practice (e.g., faculty
members given special projects, research leaves, etc.).” 114
E. Collegiality
While writing this Article, I happened to read this advice for faculty
candidates giving job talks from Dan Shapiro, Chair of the Humanities
Department at the Penn State College of Medicine:
Fragile faculty members are a drain on our system, and more
important, on me. If they need a certain temperature in their office
(within two degrees), can’t function if their mailbox gets moved, and
panic if the class times change, then life will be hard on all of us. I
need faculty members who can help nourish our fragile students even
in tough circumstances, not suck away all the resources because they
themselves can’t tolerate life’s normal insults. 115

My reaction was total disbelief. Shapiro’s rhetoric—and perhaps his
actions—exclude the “fragile,” the hypersensitive, and many of the
mentally ill from positions in his department. I regularly ask the
facilities department to turn down the temperature in my office and in
my classrooms because I sweat from general anxiety; I often get
flustered by a room change or a schedule change; and life’s “normal
insults”—for example, one negative comment on a course evaluation—
bother me. In excluding me, and others like me, Professor Shapiro
excludes our energy, our creativity, our voices, and perhaps our abilities
to relate to the “fragile” students whom he describes.
Price recounts the common narrative of how mentally ill faculty
members “are labeled as ‘difficult’ and become the object of
administrative hand-wringing, or even formal sanctions. In this case,
we might think of Professor Y, who is notorious for her outbursts in
113. FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 53, at 12 (emphasis added).
114. BARBARA A. LEE & PETER H. RUGER, ACCOMMODATING FACULTY AND STAFF WITH
PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES 16–17 (2003).
115. Dan Shapiro, Grim Job Talks Are a Buzz Kill, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (July 16,
2012), http://chronicle.com/article/Grim-Job-Talks-AreaBuzzKill/132843/?cid=at&utm_source
=at&utm_medium=en. Cf. PRICE, supra note 1, at 117–18 (discussing the effects of a job search
on faculty candidates with disabilities).
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faculty meetings and who is whispered to be ‘unbalanced.’” 116 The
speaker whom my law school invited to our spring faculty retreat to
provide sensitivity training on mental illness consults with employers on
working with “difficult” people and talked about how to “manage” and
“deal with” mentally ill academics. There is also an assumption in
much writing that mentally ill faculty members are not part of the
“collegial” group. 117 I might be “paranoid,” itself an often-described
trait of “uncollegial[ity],” 118 but I perceive that I am often viewed as
difficult or demanding, ironically, even in my request for
accommodations. 119
The American Association of University Professors warns against
using “collegiality” as an independent criterion for faculty evaluation:
[C]ollegiality is not a distinct capacity to be assessed independently of
the traditional triumvirate of teaching, scholarship, and service. It is
rather a quality whose value is expressed in the successful execution
of these three functions. . . . The current tendency to isolate
collegiality as a distinct dimension of evaluation, however, poses
several dangers. Historically, “collegiality” has not infrequently been
associated with ensuring homogeneity, and hence with practices that
exclude persons on the basis of their difference from a perceived
norm. The invocation of “collegiality” may also threaten academic
freedom. . . . [C]ollegiality may be confused with the expectation that
a faculty member display “enthusiasm” or “dedication,” evince “a
constructive attitude” that will “foster harmony,” or display an
excessive deference to administrative or faculty decisions where these
may require reasoned discussion. Such expectations are flatly
contrary to elementary principles of academic freedom, which protect
a faculty member’s right to dissent from the judgments of colleagues
and administrators. 120

This warning is particularly welcome for a faculty member whose
reality is not shaded but defined in black and white. One colleague calls
116. PRICE, supra note 1, at 2–3.
117. Jennifer Ruark, In Academic Culture, Mental Health Problems Are Hard to Recognize
and Hard to Treat, CHRON. (Feb. 16, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/In-Academe-MentalHealth/64246/ (“Historically, ‘collegial’ has too often been code for ‘just like us[,]’” which can
drive out otherwise qualified faculty members); PRICE, supra note 1, at 112–17.
118. PRICE, supra note 1, at 114.
119. Price notes that there is very little current research on the issue of accommodating mental
disabilities outside of studies on lawsuits under the ADA. However, the research that has been
done seems to indicate that “employees fear asking for accommodation, and when they do ask,
report being further stigmatized . . . . This creates . . . a ‘disclosure conundrum’: to obtain
accommodation, a person with a mental disability must disclose; but the act of disclosure itself
may bring about stigmatization and retaliation.” Id. at 118.
120. On Collegiality as a Criterion for Faculty Evaluation, AAUP (Nov. 1999), http://www.
aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/contents/collegiality.htm.
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me an “enigma” because he cannot figure out whether I will support the
administration from issue to issue. His reaction is not surprising; I
support not what the administration wants or does not want, but what I
think is “right.” At the same time, however, I am “highly committed to
[my] organization, driven to succeed, and loyal.” 121
Neither Price nor I suggest that faculty conduct that does not conform
to institutional norms should be condoned; we ask instead for a
“clearer” and more “ethical” conceptualization of what those norms
are. 122 Mental illness should not excuse conduct harmful to the
institution, and I receive mental health treatment for both personal and
professional reasons to enable me to excel at work. At the same time,
colleagues can be “affirming” toward faculty members with “hidden”
disabilities—in standing by such a colleague under scrutiny or taking
collective action on behalf of that faculty member (e.g., by writing a
collaborative memo to the administration). 123 A “small gesture or a few
well-placed words can have enormous impact.” 124
“We must
proliferate our ways of asking for—and listening—for feedback,” 125
which suggests that feedback should be more democratic and go in
many directions (e.g., faculty-to-faculty, administrator-to-faculty, and
faculty-to-administrator). I am evaluated on a yearly basis by my
academic deans and tenure committee, but I am never given the
opportunity to evaluate them. More pointedly, the “shameful statistics
on employment levels of persons with mental disabilities, the silence
around mental disability in academe, and our scarcity in faculty
positions generally, are also feedback, if we pay attention to them.” 126
As Price writes, there is no “one size fits all” for access. 127 For
example, my communication style differs from the “normal-minded”: I
am direct, honest, and literal; I often miss social cues and nuances; and I
am an incredibly fast thinker and worker, which is refreshing to some
colleagues and off-putting to others. The solution is a structural one—
we need “more democratic systems of communication that make room
for difference.” 128 For example, I am much more comfortable
communicating by email than in person. 129 As Ramona Paetzold
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
anxiety

Paetzold, supra note 64, at 373.
PRICE, supra note 1, at 115.
Id. at 132.
Id.
Id. at 130 (emphasis added).
Id. at 131.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 116.
Cf. id. at 90 (“For my own frenetic, visual/verbal ways of learning—not to mention my
during face-to-face interactions—holding two or three conversations via chat is
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writes, “opening the doors for those with mental illnesses means that
innovation is required to find ways to alter the work environment to
embrace them and render them enabled.” 130
III. MAD AT SCHOOL: WHAT MATTERS?
In Mad at School, Price, with humility and compassion, analyzes the
rhetoric in academic discourse about mental disabilities. Her analysis is
critical to making much-needed progress in higher education toward
removing stigma and obstacles for academics with mental illness. In
addition, law, medicine, and “outsider” narratives—all discussed by
Price 131—offer insights into how we can remove the secrecy and stigma
surrounding mental illness in legal education.
A. Rhetoric and Context Matter
After listening to a social worker talk at our faculty retreat about how
to work with “difficult” (i.e., mentally ill) people, I could not stand it
anymore. I spoke out about how I had been diagnosed with both
Bipolar Disorder and BPD. I argued that mentally ill academics
frequently have tremendous creativity, energy, and drive, and can make
enormous contributions to educational institutions, often because of
their illnesses. Taken off guard, she responded that she was focusing on
acute disorders, such as anxiety and depression, and not personality
disorders. She did not even acknowledge that the symptoms of
personality disorders are often acute (e.g., panic, depression, mania,
etc.). That was my “coming out” to my faculty colleagues, to which
most responded, “I never would have known.”
The social worker’s rhetoric did more to stigmatize mental illness
than to eliminate stigma, in large part because of the context in which
she spoke—she was the alleged expert on mental illness in the
workplace. After the presentation, one of my curmudgeonly colleagues
came up to me and said, “Greg, I didn’t know you were a nutcase.” In
most contexts, such a comment would be insulting and dehumanizing,
but this colleague made his comment as a sign of support and affection.
Context matters.
While writing this Article, Jesse Jackson Jr., the U.S. Representative
for Illinois’s Second Congressional District, went missing from

considerably more effective and more energy-efficient than holding one oral/aural conference in
person.”).
130. Paetzold, supra note 64, at 371.
131. See PRICE, supra note 1, at 52 (commenting that medical or “other” narratives with
respect to disability attempt to “cure” through rhetoric).
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Congress. 132 After much speculation, his staff released a statement
from an unidentified doctor that Jackson was “receiving intensive
medical treatment at a residential treatment facility for a mood
disorder,” “responding positively to treatment,” and “expected to make
a full recovery.” 133 His office first announced that he was taking a
medical leave of absence for “exhaustion.” 134 Using “exhaustion” as a
misnomer for mental illness is stigmatizing; when administrators and
colleagues tell me they worry about me “burning out” or becoming
“exhausted,” they are, although well-intentioned, minimizing that my
illness is part of my mind. Likewise, the remark that Jackson is
“expected to make a full recovery” suggests that mental illness can be
“cured,” a suggestion that both Price and I would agree is rhetorically
crippling.
B. Law Matters
The ADA has largely failed academics with mental illness. 135 These
academics cannot prove that they have a “disability,” that they are
“otherwise qualified” to perform the “essential functions” of the job, or
that their accommodations are “reasonable.” 136
While some
commentators have called for courts to interpret the ADA more
broadly, 137 the problem is with the ADA itself. Kathleen Zylan notes:
Perhaps in an effort to combat fears of overinclusiveness by covering
the mentally ill under the ADA, Congress drafted an ambiguous
statute that has undoubtedly led to economic waste in the form of
increased litigation and employment costs as employers and courts
wade through the nebulous language.
These ambiguities are
particularly troublesome when claims are based on mental disability
rather than physical disability because the nature of mental illness
lends itself to more speculation and less confidence in the veracity of
the claim of disability. This lack of precision in diagnosis of a mental
disorder, coupled with the ambiguities in the language of the ADA,

132. Kate Bolduan & Deidre Walsh, Rep. Jesse Jackson Jr. Being Treated for Mood Disorder,
Statement Says, CNN (July 11, 2012), http://articles.cnn.com/2012-07-11/politics/politics_
congress-jackson-absence_1_jackson-bipolar-mood-disorder.
133. Id.
134. Abdon M. Pallasch & Lynn Sweet, Jesse Jackson Jr. Takes Medical Leave for
‘Exhaustion,’ CHI. SUN-TIMES, (June 25, 2012, 5:36 PM), http://www.suntimes.com/news/
politics/13408948-418/us-rep-jesse-jackson-jr-takes-medical-leave-for-exhaustion.html.
135. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (citing scholarly examples of the ADA’s
shortcomings).
136. See supra notes 55−74 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty that mentally
impaired faculty have in bringing successful ADA claims).
137. See, e.g., Paetzold, supra note 64, at 363−82 (suggesting that courts should expand their
ADA interpretations to include mental disabilities).
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also provides difficulties for employers when making employment
decisions. Thus, the ADA fails not only the employees, but also the
employers. 138

We need to advocate for laws and regulations that do not clutch to a
definition of “disability” more suited for those with physical
impairments, but that cover mental illness more broadly and explicitly,
including specific illnesses and symptoms. Likewise, we need to think
of “accommodations” more broadly.
For example, the Job
Accommodation Network suggests that supervisors can do the
following for employees with mental health impairments:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Provide positive praise and reinforcement,
Provide day-to-day guidance and feedback,
Provide written job instructions via email,
Develop clear expectations of responsibilities and the
consequences of not meeting performance standards,
Schedule consistent meetings with employee to set goals and
review progress,
Allow for open communication,
Establish written long term and short term goals,
Develop strategies to deal with conflict,
Develop a procedure to evaluate the effectiveness of the
accommodation,
Educate all employees on their right to accommodations,
Provide sensitivity training to coworkers and supervisors,
Do not mandate that employees attend work-related social
functions, and
Encourage all employees to move non-work-related conversations
out of work areas. 139

“Mad” faculty members should also encourage their academic
institutions to adopt policies for faculty members with mental and
physical impairments. I was surprised that many institutions, including
my own, do not have such policies. Two leading higher education
lawyers advise educational institutions, “If your institution has a policy
for dealing with faculty or staff disabilities, consult that first. If your
institution has no such policy, it should develop one immediately.” 140
Similarly, the American Association of University Professors wrote,
“Most institutions have well-developed procedures for managing the
138. Zylan, supra note 55, at 80−81 (footnotes omitted).
139. BETH LOY, ACCOMMODATION AND COMPLIANCE SERIES: EMPLOYEES WITH MENTAL
HEALTH IMPAIRMENTS, JOB ACCOMMODATION NETWORK 10 (2011), available at https://askjan.
org/media/downloads/PsychiatricA&CSeries.pdf.
140. LEE & RUGER, supra note 114, at 16.
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needs of students who have disabilities. Procedures for managing
faculty accommodation requests, while used less frequently, are equally
important.” 141
In this area, the “outsider” narrative is particularly important because
academic institutions can provide greater clarity and certainty than the
ADA and better support and protection for impaired faculty members.
While this can benefit “mad” faculty members, it can also benefit
educational institutions. As Ramona Paetzold wrote:
Ironically, employers can benefit from employees with BPD during
those hypomanic periods when they tend to be goal-directed, more
creative, and requiring little sleep, particularly if facilitated by
surrounding conditions. It would simply be unfair (and societally
unwise) to eliminate such employees if they then exhibit temporary
behavioral or performance limitations . . . . [O]pening the doors for
those with mental illnesses means that innovation is required to find
ways to alter the work environment to embrace them and render them
enabled. 142

Paetzold explicitly makes room for the narrative of faculty who
contribute to academic institutions because of their mental impairments.
C. Medical Treatment Matters
In February 2012, I was preparing for a consultation with one of the
country’s leading psychiatrists on pharmacological treatments for BPD.
I read his latest research, which suggested that carbamazepine—which I
took at the time—was ineffective for treating BPD and that Topomax
had been proven effective. I met with him, and after talking to me for
an hour, he advised me that the Topomax trials were not relevant to me,
and I should stay on carbamazepine. I started seeing a new psychiatrist
two months later, and she took me off of the carbamazepine and put me
on Lamictal, yet a third mood stabilizer.
Despite the pronouncement that the “revisions of [the] DSM have
represented an increasing adherence to a model of disability as a
measurable and biological phenomenon,” 143 the diagnosis and treatment
141. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, ACCOMMODATING FACULTY MEMBERS WHO HAVE
DISABILITIES 2–3 (2012), available at http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/49CCE979-73DF4AF4-96A2-10B2F111EFBA/0/Disabilities.pdf%203 (footnotes omitted). See also Faculty &
Staff Assistance Program, UNIV. OF MICH., http://www.umich.edu/~fasap/ (last visited Feb. 11,
2013); Faculty & Staff Assistance Program, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV., http://www.jhu.edu/~hr1/
fasap/fasap.htm (last modified Sept. 20, 2010). But see DARTMOUTH COLL., DARTMOUTH
EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK (2011), available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/~hrs/handbook/dartmouth
_employee_handbook.pdf (providing no mention of assistance for faculty members with mental
illness).
142. Paetzold, supra note 64, at 371.
143. PRICE, supra note 1, at 34.
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of mental illness is subjective and imprecise. 144 As my experience
above shows, psychotropic medications are not “magic bullets” that can
erase or cure mental illness. 145 Indeed, psychiatrists cannot even agree
on the most effective medication for treating any particular illness or
symptom. Likewise, non-medicinal treatment recommendations for
BPD include such widely different treatments as Dialectical Behavior
Therapy, 146 Schema Focused Therapy, 147 Mentalization Based
Therapy, 148 and Transference Focused Psychotherapy. 149
However, we should not jump to the conclusions that medicine and
science are arbitrary or do not matter to individuals with mental illness.
Different medications and treatments have good outcomes for
individuals with BPD; 150 the frustration is that no medication or
treatment works for everyone. 151 Price contemplates “a [psychiatric]
144. See Moses & Barlow, supra note 32, at 147 (discussing possible reasons why these types
of diagnoses are so subjective and imprecise).
145. See PRICE, supra note 1, at 110–11 (“Suggesting that a person’s mental disability
effectively disappears with the application of medication is as absurd as suggesting that his
hearing disability disappeared because he uses hearing aids . . . .”).
146. Dialectical Based Therapy (“DBT”) focuses on recognizing and balancing opposite
emotions and behavioral tensions. MARSHA M. LINEHAN, COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL TREATMENT
OF BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER 201 (1993).
147. Schema Focused Therapy helps a person confront childhood memories and experiences.
PAUL M. SALKOVSKIS, FRONTIERS OF COGNITIVE THERAPY 187 (1996).
148. Mentalization Based Therapy helps the patient focus on his or her own mental states,
including feelings and desires, as well as those of others. ANTHONY W. BATEMAN & PETER
FONAGY, HANDBOOK OF MENTALIZING IN MENTAL HEALTH PRACTICE 67–68 (2011).
149. Transference Focused Psychotherapy uses aspects of the client-therapist relationship in
order to address BPD symptoms. JOHN F. CLARKIN ET AL., PSYCHOTHERAPY FOR BORDERLINE
PERSONALITY: FOCUSING ON OBJECT RELATIONS 242 (2006).
150. See What is DBT?, BEHAVIORAL TECH, LLC, http://behavioraltech.org/resources/
whatisdbt.cfm/ (last visited July 19, 2012) (describing two randomized controlled trials of DBT
that indicated that DBT is more effective than Treatment-As-Usual (TAU) in treatment of both
BPD and treatment of BPD and comorbid diagnosis of substance abuse). Furthermore, the trial
demonstrated that:
Clients receiving DBT, compared to TAU, were significantly less likely to drop out of
therapy, were significantly less likely to engage in parasuicide, reported significantly
fewer parasuicidal behaviors and, when engaging in parasuicidal behaviors, had less
medically severe behaviors. Further, clients receiving DBT were less likely to be
hospitalized, had fewer days in hospital, and had higher scores on global and social
adjustment.
Id.
151. Authors Western and Bradley discuss this type of difficulty with respect to treating BPD:
The empirically supported therapies movement is predicated on the assumption that
most patients either have, or can be treated as if they have, one primary syndrome, for
which a single treatment package can be designed. Without this assumption,
researchers would need to test dozens of manuals to address all the possible
interactions among disorders for even a handful of common disorders (e.g., the
interaction of major depression and panic disorder, of major depression and substance
abuse, or of major depression and both panic and substance abuse). This assumption is
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profession that is less coercive and more democratic, one that includes
not only its practitioners but also its ‘patients’ as important and
powerful voices.” 152 “Patients” are their own agents and should be
heard by their mental health providers to enable full participation by the
mentally ill in their own treatment.
D. Conclusion: Narrative Matters
Many law students experience what I did—they have acute
symptoms of mental illness manifesting themselves for the first time in
law school. 153 Students often must cope with their illnesses in secrecy
and isolation; there are no student organizations for the mentally ill as
there are for other “outsider” groups, and the student who “comes out”
faces stigma and employment obstacles. 154 As Jennifer Jolly-Ryan
not inherent in the use of randomized controlled trials; indeed, it is precisely what
distinguishes randomized controlled trials in the empirically supported therapies era
from randomized controlled trials in the past, which often used mixed patient samples.
Drew Western & Rebekah Bradley, Empirically Supported Complexity, Rethinking EvidenceBased Practice in Psychotherapy, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 266, 268 (2006).
152. PRICE, supra note 1, at 36.
153. See, e.g., Kirsten A. Dauphinais, Sea Change: The Seismic Shift in the Legal Profession
and How Legal Writing Professors Will Keep Legal Education Afloat in Its Wake, 10 SEATTLE J.
FOR SOC. JUST. 49, 112−13 (2011) (describing a 1986 study that Andrew Benjamin and
colleagues conducted investigating the incidence of mental illness among law students). The
study revealed that:
[T]he instances of psychiatric problems spiked significantly for first-year law students
and then through law school and for two years after graduation. Many students in law
school report loss of self-esteem and alienation as a result of the law school setting.
They also report feeling pressure to lay aside their values in law school. Professor
Hess reports that these feelings are even more prevalent in female and minority
students.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See generally Jennifer Jolly-Ryan, The Last Taboo: Breaking Law
Students with Mental Illness and Disabilities Out of the Stigma Straitjacket, 79 UMKC L. REV.
123, 144 (2010) (“Many law students begin their legal education with little or no signs of mental
impairment such as depression or anxiety. But due to the nature of a legal education . . .
depression and anxiety may develop.”); Robert P. Schuwerk, The Law Professor as Fiduciary:
What Duties Do We Owe to Our Students?, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 753, 764−66 (2003) (arguing that
most law school faculty are unaware of the rise in the amount of “literature documenting the
extreme levels of mental illness and substance abuse that develop among law students while in
law school . . . . Many of those who are familiar with this body of work either do not believe that
it is true or else attribute it to [other] causes”); Kevin H. Smith, Disabilities, Law Schools, and
Law Students: A Proactive and Holistic Approach, 32 AKRON L. REV. 1, 28 (1999) (“A student
who coped well with the stress of undergraduate studies may find herself affected for the first
time when faced with the chronic and generally greater stress of law school.”).
154. Jolly-Ryan hypothesizes a reason for this fear of stigmatization:
Law students do not want to chance jeopardizing their future careers. Law students
with mental illnesses, disorders, or disabilities may fear that disclosure will make them
ineligible to sit for the bar exam. One author notes that “[t]here are many disincentives
within the legal community for a person to admit that they have a problem. One such
disincentive is that if a law student discloses that they are receiving treatment . . . [for a
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notes:
Ironically, the very people who are in the best position to increase the
number of lawyers who intimately understand the discrimination and
health care laws in our society impose some of the highest hurdles to
employment and educational opportunities. Lawyers stigmatize and
often decline to hire other lawyers unless they have a clean mental
health history—free of disabilities, disorders, and illnesses. 155

Narratives open up opportunities for mentoring 156 and community 157
among the mentally ill in legal education and can begin to break down
the secrecy, isolation, and stigma experienced by those with mental
illness.
Yet, any acknowledgement of mental illness can be “dangerous,” 158
leading to the same isolation and stigma that “outsider” narratives can
combat. Academics who commit to writing narratives about mental
illness often back out. 159 Out of fear, I have stopped writing this Article
many times. Narrative has no power in secrecy, however, and like
Margaret Price, James Jones, and Ellen Saks, I have decided to share
my own.

mental disease] they will not be allowed to take the bar exam.” Therefore, the decision
to self-identify as a student with mental or emotional issues and to seek any help from
mental health professionals is a difficult one.
Jolly-Ryan, supra note 153, at 129 (quoting Carol M. Langford, Depression, Substance Abuse,
and Intellectual Property Lawyers, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 875, 900 (2005) (footnotes omitted)).
155. Jolly-Ryan, supra note 153, at 123−24.
156. Cf. PRICE, supra note 1, at 138−40 (discussing mentoring).
157. Id. at 19−20 (“In my own experience, claiming disability has been a journey of
community, power, and love.”).
158. Id. at 131.
159. Id.

